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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT FEATHERHAT 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
Criminal No. 051500011 
BRYAN FEATHERHAT, Appellate Case No. 20090387 
Judge: G. Michael Westfall 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this case originates in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 78a-3-102 (3)(i)(1953, as amended), in that it involves 
convictions of criminal charges which are first degree felonies. On or about the 12th day 
of May, 2009, Utah Supreme Court, pursuant to Rule 42(a), of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, transferred this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition 
which was received without objection by the parties. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
Issues presented for appeal in this case by Appellant are as follows: 
ISSUE NO. 1: Whether or not the jury was adequately and properly instructed 
and does it qualify under plain error as a manifest in justice exception? 
ISSUE No. 2: Whether or not the trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion 
to suppress? 
ISSUE No. 3: Whether or not there was sufficient evidence to support the 
conviction of aggravated robbery? 
ISSUE No. 4: Whether or not the Appellant received ineffective assistance of 
counsel at trial? 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review is believed to be one of "correctness" as it applies to 
questions of law and the interpretation of statute and the standard is "clearly erroneous" 
as it applies to questions of fact, State v. Ross, 2007 UT 89, at paragraph 17; and State 
v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT49, at paragraphs 11 and 12. See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
774 and State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048 (Utah App 1991) and also State v. Gibbons, 
770 P.2d 1133 (Utah App 1989) and State v. Girrard, 574 P.2d 885 (Utah App 1978). 
In assessing a claim that there was insufficient evidence to support a jury verdict, the 
Supreme Court sustains unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence or if it 
reaches a definite or firm conviction that a mistake has been made, State v. Briggs, 
2008 UT 83, at paragraph 11; see also, State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 (UT 1988) 
(quoting State v. Walker 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). The Supreme Court reviews 
for clear error the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision to deny a motion 
to suppress. Whether the trial court correctly denied the motion to suppress, however, 
is a legal conclusion that it views for correctness, State v. Applegate, 2008 UT 63 at 
paragraph 5. See also, State v. Kurkowski, 2004 UT 94, at paragraph 15 P.3d 1222 and 
State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, at paragraph 15, 103 P.3d 699. Where claims are not 
preserved the Supreme Court reviews only for plain error. To prevail an Appellant must 
demonstrate that (i) the error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court and; (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error there is a reasonable likelihood 
of a more favorable outcome. State v. Ross, 2007 UT 89, at paragraph 17; see also 
State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, at paragraph 26, 128 P.3d 1179 (quoting State v. Haqson, 
2004 UT 99, at paragraph 10, 108 P.3d 6957. Regarding a claim for ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court reviews for correctness the trial court's 
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application of law to the facts. It defers to the trial court's factual findings unless clearly 
erroneous but remains free to make an independent determination of the trial court's 
legal conclusions. State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14 at paragraph 37. The right to counsel 
embodied in the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution is a right to the 
effective assistance of counsel. A defendant is deprived of this right when his counsel's 
conduct so undermines the proper function of the adversarial process that the 
proceedings cannot be relied on in having produced a just result. Ineffective assistance 
of counsel is proven when performance is so deficient as to fall below an objective 
standard of reasonableness and except for such deficient performance there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. Id. at 
paragraph 68; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The Appellant is aware of no statutory provision that is dispositive and believes 
the following apply: 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-5-202 (1953, as amended) 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated murder if the actor intentionally or 
knowingly causes the death of another under any of the following circumstances:... 
(c) the actor knowingly created a great risk of death to a person other than the victim and 
the actor;... 
(f) the homicide was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing an arrest of the 
defendant or another by a peace officer acting under color of legal authority of for the 
purpose of effecting the defendant's or another's escape from lawful custody. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-5-205.5 (1953, as amended) 
(1) Special mitigation exists when the actor causes the death of another or attempts to 
cause the death of another: 
(a) (i) under circumstances that are not legally justified, but the actor acts under a 
delusion attributable to a mental illness as defined in Section 76-2-305; 
(ii) the nature of the delusion is such that, if the facts existed as the defendant believed 
them to be in the delusional state, those facts would provide a legal justification for the 
defendant's conduct; and 
(iii) the defendant's actions, in light of the delusion, were reasonable from the objective 
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viewpoint of a reasonable person; or 
(b) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable 
explanation or excuse. 
(2) A defendant who was under the influence of voluntarily consumed, injected, or 
ingested alcohol, controlled substances, or volatile substances at the time of the alleged 
offense may not claim mitigation of the offense under Subsection (1)(a) on the basis of 
mental illness if the alcohol or substance caused, triggered, or substantially contributed 
to the mental illness. 
(3) Under Subsection (1)(b), emotional distress does not include: 
(a) a condition resulting from mental illness as defined in Section 76-2-305; or 
(b) distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own conduct. 
(4) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection (1)(b) shall be 
determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing 
circumstances. 
(5) (a) If the trier of fact finds the elements of an offense as listed in Subsection (5)(b) are 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and also that the existence of special mitigation 
under this section is established by a preponderance of the evidence, it shall return a 
verdict on the reduced charge as provided in Subsection (5)(b). 
(b) If under Subsection (5)(a) the offense is: 
(i) aggravated murder, the defendant shall instead be found guilty of murder; 
(ii) attempted aggravated murder, the defendant shall instead be found guilty of 
attempted murder; 
(iii) murder, the defendant shall instead be found guilty of manslaughter; or 
(iv) attempted murder, the defendant shall instead be found guilty of attempted 
manslaughter. 
(6) (a) If a jury is the trier of fact, a unanimous vote of the jury is required to establish the 
existence of the special mitigation. 
(b) If the jury does find special mitigation by a unanimous vote, it shall return a verdict on 
the reduced charge as provided in Subsection (5). 
(c) If the jury finds by a unanimous vote that special mitigation has not been established, 
it shall convict the defendant of the greater offense for which the prosecution has 
established all the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 
(d) If the jury is unable to unanimously agree whether or not special mitigation has been 
established, the result is a hung jury. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-6-302 (1953, as amended) 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section
 76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course of 
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in 
the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-16a-102 (1953, as amended) 
(1) If a defendant asserts a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity, the court shall 
instruct the jury that it may find the defendant: 
(a) guilty; 
(b) guilty and mentally ill at the time of the offense; 
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(c) guilty of a lesser offense; 
(d) guilty of a lesser offense and mentally ill at the time of the offense; 
(e) not guilty by reason of insanity; or 
(f) not guilty. 
(2) (a) When a defendant asserts a mental defense pursuant to Section 76-2-305 or 
asserts special mitigation reducing the level of an offense pursuant to Subsection 76-5-
205.5(1 )(a), or when the evidence raises the issue and either party requests the 
instruction, the jury shall be instructed that if it finds a defendant guilty by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of any changed offense or lesser included offense, it shall also return a 
special verdict indicating whether it finds that the defendant was mentally ill at the time of 
the offense. 
(b) If the jury finds the defendant guilty of the charged offense by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and by special verdict finds the defendant was mentally ill at the time 
of the offense, it shall return the general verdict of "guilty and mentally ill at the time of the 
offense." 
(c) If the jury finds the defendant guilty of a lesser offense by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and by special verdict finds the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the 
offense, it shall return the general verdict of "guilty of a lesser offense and mentally ill at 
the time of the offense." 
(d) If the jury finds the defendant guilty of the charged offense or a lesser included 
offense and does not find that the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the offense, 
the jury shall return a verdict of "guilty" of that offense, along with the special verdict form 
indicating that the jury did not find the defendant mentally ill at the time of the offense. 
(e) The special verdict shall be returned by the jury at the same time as the general 
verdict, to indicate the basis for its general verdict. 
(3) In determining whether a defendant should be found guilty and mentally ill at the time 
of the offense, the jury shall be instructed that the standard of proof applicable to a 
finding of mental illness is by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury shall also be 
instructed that the standard of preponderance of the evidence does not apply to the 
elements establishing a defendant's guilt, and that the proof of the elements establishing 
a defendant's guilt of any offense must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE of the CASE: This is a criminal case where the Appellant was 
charged with attempted aggravated murder in violation of Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 76-5-202 (1953, as amended) and aggravated robbery, in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 76-6-302 (1953, as amended). The Appellant was charged 
also with theft, a second degree felony but this was later dismissed in the amended 
information. It was considered as one o f t 
The lesser included offenses on the general verdict form. It was alleged that on 
or about the 5th day of January, 2007, an officer stopped to assist Appellant whose 
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vehicle was stuck in a snow bank. Another vehicle was attempting to help Appellant get 
it with a tow chain. The Appellant had been drinking and perhaps fearful he would be 
arrested, shot officer Jason Thomas. He allegedly did it with a pistol grip a 12-gauge 
shotgun although neither witness from the assisting vehicle saw what happened. The 
officer testified that the Appellant shot him at close range in the chest and fired a 
second shot hitting him in the head, shoulder and back as he tried to take cover. The 
Appellant then removed the tow chain and fled in the vehicle of those assisting. The 
vehicle was recovered abandoned in Cedar Valley. The Appellant was later seen 
walking north along Old Highway 91 in the early morning some distance from the 
scene. As they were searching for him, police officers searched the home of his parents 
where he was staying. They did so without obtaining a warrant, relying upon the 
claimed consent given by Appellant's father. When the Appellant was picked up and in 
response to questions from the arresting officer, he made admissions. He asked how 
he, presumably meaning the officer, was doing. He claimed to have been seeing things 
and hearing voices. The Appellant was arrested and a preliminary hearing was held on 
the 3rd day of April, 2007. He was bound over on each offense and later pled not guilty 
to the charges. In November, 2007, counsel for Appellant moved to suppress evidence 
and an evidentiary hearing was held on the 14th day of January, 2008. Thereafter, the 
parties submitted points and authorities and the trial court rendered its order granting in 
part and denying in part Appellant's motion to suppress. The same was entered on or 
about the 30th day of July, 2008. In August, the Appellant through his appointed counsel 
gave notice of intent to claim diminished capacity and a mental health assessment was 
conducted by doctors Richard Wootton and Tim Kockler who were appointed as 
alienists. Each found the Appellant competent to stand trial and both noted mental 
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illness complicated by the use of alcohol. Dr. Wootton found the Appellant likely met the 
standard for guilty and mentally ill. The case went to trial in November, 2008 After three 
days, a verdict was returned of guilty to attempted aggravated murder and aggravated 
robbery, each a first-degree felony. The Appellant did not testify at trial. The trial court 
refused to give a jury instruction submitted by counsel for Appellant on mitigation but 
submitted a special jury verdict form to consider guilty and mentally ill. The general 
verdict form provided an alternative to consider, not guilty by reason of insanity. A 
presentence investigation report was compiled recommending that the Appellant be 
committed to the Utah State Prison. The matter came before the trial court on the 20th 
day of January, 2009. The judge entered judgment, findings, sentence and commitment 
on the 17th day of March, 2009. See the record at 482-485; see also Exhibit A, 
Addendum attached. In February, 2009, the Appellant sent a letter to the trial court 
which appeared to be a notice of appeal but was sufficiently unclear to require his 
return and have new counsel appointed. To the extent that Appellant's attempt was to 
request a new trial, the same was withdrawn by Appellant in open court and notice of 
appeal was filed on or about the 19th day of February, 2009. 
B. COURSE of PROCEEDINGS and DISPOSITION at TRIAL: The Appellant 
was arrested the day after the incident in the early morning hours. He was interrogated 
about an hour after his arrest. His bedroom at the home of his parents was searched 
prior to arrest. A preliminary hearing was conducted on or about the 3rd day of April, 
2007, and he was bound over on the original charges. A motion to suppress was filed in 
November, 2007, and an evidentiary hearing was conducted on or about the 14th day of 
January, 2008. Points and authorities were submitted by the attorneys of record and the 
trial court judge entered his decision and order granting in part and denying in part 
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Appellant's motion to suppress on or about the 30 day of July, 2008. See the record at 
265-287; see also Exhibit B, Addendum attached. Notice of intent to claim diminished 
capacity was filed in August, 2008, and an order requiring the Department of Human 
Services to examine the Appellant and investigate his mental condition was filed on or 
about the 18th day of August, 2008. Counsel stipulated to a jury verdict form consistent 
with the amended information filed at the time of trial which considered as an additional 
alternative for each charge not guilty by reason of insanity. It would consider on a 
special verdict form guilty and mentally ill. A three-day jury trial was held in November, 
2008 and the jury returned a verdict of guilty to each count. There was provision made 
for lesser offenses. The Appellant was sentenced on or about the 20th day of January, 
2009. However, the judgment, findings, sentence and commitment was not filed until 
the 17th day of March, 2009. Appellant withdrew his motion for new trial and appeal was 
filed in February, 2009. The Appellant is presently incarcerated on the charges pending 
on appeal. 
STATEMENT of FACTS 
1. On or about the 5th day of January, 2007, officer Jason Thomas stopped to 
assist a stalled motorist. Two vehicles were pulled to the side of the road and it 
appeared that one was attempting to tow the other or pull it out from a snow bank. 
Officer Thomas first spoke with the Appellant, the driver of the stalled motor vehicle and 
collected his personal information. See the record at 3. He apparently had been 
drinking. See trial transcript, volume 2, pages 144 to 146, in the record at 506. The 
other vehicle was occupied by two adults and three children. It was actually the 
Appellant's cousin, her children with her boyfriend in his truck that were assisting. Id at 
page 67. As the officer assisted, the Appellant allegedly retrieved a 12-guage shotgun 
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from his vehicle and shot the officer at close range in the chest. See the record at 3. 
The officer had on body armor. He retreated for cover and in the course of doing so, a 
second shot was fired hitting him in the head, shoulder, and back. Id. 
2. Those in the assisting vehicle heard the shots and ran to a nearby field. See 
trail transcript, volume 2 and pages 68, 73, 98-102, in the record at 506. The Appellant 
allegedly attempted to get his cousin to drive the second vehicle for him. Id. She 
refused. Both testified that the Appellant did not point the gun at them and the cousin 
who was the closest, about five feet from Appellant stated she was not afraid of 
Appellant. Id at pages 77, 87, and 107; see also excerpts from trial transcripts at Exhibit 
C, Addendum attached. She then fled to where her children and boyfriend were hiding. 
Id. The Appellant allegedly unhooked the vehicle and fled in it without permission. Id. 
The vehicle was retrieved later that night some distance away. See trial transcript, 
volume 2 at page 140, in the record at 506. 
3. The Appellant was seen walking along Old Highway 91 along 1-15 north 
between Cedar City and Enoch, Utah, about four o'clock in the morning. See trial 
transcript, volume 2, at page 140, in the record at 506. He was arrested by officer Matt 
Topham. Detective Tim Bonzo of the Cedar City Police Department also was present. 
Officer Topham asked the Appellant where his shotgun was concerned for safety since 
the Appellant didn't have it with him. See hearing transcript, Motion to Suppress at 
pages 13-15, in the record at 503. Appellant said he hid it in the mountains. Id. He was 
taken to the police station. Officer Mike Bleak questioned him. Id. He gave him a 
blanket and some hot chocolate. Id at pages 19-26. During the initial part of the 
interview, the Appellant made a statement, "Is he all right?". Id at 21. This was before 
he was advised of his right to remain silent. Id. He also indicated that he had heard 
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voices that had told him to murder. Id at 22. When advised of his rights, the Appellant 
was ambiguous in his response as to whether he understood them but the interview 
continued. Id at 29-31. 
4. A preliminary hearing was held on the 3rd day of April, 2007 and the Appellant 
was bound over on the original charges. See the record at 111-112. He pled not guilty. 
Id at 120-121. A motion to suppress was filed in November of that year and an 
evidentiary hearing was held on or about the 14th day of January, 2008. Id at 171, 198 
and 265. Counsel moved to suppress statements made by Appellant at the time of 
arrest and during interrogation and for items removed from Appellant's residence 
through the warrantless search. Id. At the evidentiary hearing, the officers testified that 
the Appellant's father consented to searching the residence. See hearing transcript, 
Motion to Suppress at pages 44-45, in the record at 503. However, the Appellant's 
father testified that he understood the search was simply to try and locate the Appellant 
and that when he discovered they were searching for personal property he asked them 
to leave and get a warrant. Id at pages 52-55. 
5. The trial court judge denied Appellant's motion to suppress as to post-Miranda 
statements and regarding items retrieved from the search of Appellant's bedroom. See 
the record at 265. 
6. Thereafter, notice was filed to claim diminished mental capacity and the 
Appellant was ordered to undergo an evaluation. Id at 295. The appointed alienists 
found the Appellant competent to stand trial but noted issues of metal disorder 
including hallucinations and delusions complicated by the use of alcohol. See the 
record at 224-28, 235-41, 311-15 and 319-29. Dr. Kockler found alcohol induced 
psychotic disorder with hallucinations with onset during intoxication. Dr. Wootton found 
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Appellant likely to meet the standard for guilty and mentally ill. Id. Parties stipulated to 
allowing as a consideration not guilty by reason of insanity as part of the general verdict 
form. A special verdict form was used to take into consideration the alternative of guilty 
and mentally ill. Id at 424 and 427. The trial court judge did not allow Appellant's 
requested instruction for special mitigation. See trial transcript, volume 4, at pages 3-5, 
in the record at 505. 
7. The Appellant did not testify at trial. Instruction No. 10 concerning attempted 
aggravated murder addressed the victim by name but was not objected to by 
Appellant's counsel. Id. See the record at 406. Other instructions given did not identify 
the victims by name. See the record at 407-410; see elements instructions at Exhibit D, 
Addendum attached. 
8. After three days, the jury returned a verdict of guilty to both counts of the 
amended information. It made a finding on the special verdict form of guilty and not 
mentally ill. See the record at 424 and 427; see also verdict and special verdict retruns 
at Exhibit E, Addendum attached. 
9. Just prior to sentencing, the Appellant submitted a letter which was ambiguous 
as to asserting an appeal or requesting a new trial and later withdrew his request for 
new trial to go forward on appeal. Id at 472. The Appellant did assert grievances which 
are viewed by this attorney as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. This case 
was assigned to the Court of Appeals in May, 2009. Id at 499. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. 
The jury was not adequately instructed on the burden of proof and the Court 
refused to given an instruction on special mitigation, finding that the evidence was not 
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sufficient to allow such instruction. In fact, the instruction was disallowed because the 
use of alcohol was involved. However, Appellant contends that it was for the jury to 
decide and that the instruction should have been given. Moreover, the elements 
instruction No. 10, concerning attempt of aggravated murder should not have identified 
the victim, JASON THOMAS, by name which played upon the sympathies and passions 
of the jury. This was the only instruction that identified its victim so precisely and there 
was no reason to be so specific. However, defense counsel did not object and therefore 
consideration is limited to plan error review. The Appellant asserts that one cannot 
assume the jury would have convicted notwithstanding the mistake because the various 
instructions apply to lesser offenses that did not have the same specificity. That 
Appellant was convicted and not acquitted or found guilty for a lesser charge 
establishes harm. 
B. 
The trial court erred in denying Appellant's Motion to Suppress, which the Court 
reviews for correctness, giving no defense to the decision of the trial court. The trial 
court did not consider the totality of the circumstances correctly, finding the Appellant 
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to remain silent when there was no clear 
response or statement made by Appellant to support that position. Instead, the trial 
court looked to the inconsistent action and statements made by Appellant during 
interrogation and concluded this to be convincing to establish that the Appellant waived 
his right. The trial court should have considered the circumstances incident to the 
interrogation, the Appellant's physical and emotional condition, the immediacy of the 
interrogation after arrest and the need for it. The interrogating officer staged the 
interrogation to come off friendly and trusting and then used that relationship of trust to 
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manipulate the Appellant. In context, the ploy did not support the pre-Miranda 
admission and it should have been suppressed. 
The trial court also erred in condoning the warantless search of the Appellant's 
bedroom as consensual. It was wrong to consider in the context of credibility of 
witnesses. To allow the matter to be resolved upon law enforcement's self serving 
testimony verse that of the party upon whom law enforcement may be intruding without 
authority is a receipt for disaster in establishing precedent. In this case, the officer's had 
no probable cause or extenuating reason or justification to continue searching after they 
established the fact that Appellant was not there and after Appellant's father told them 
to leave and get a warrant. To get a warrant would not have been an undue hardship on 
law enforcement. 
C. 
There was insufficient evidence to convict the Appellant of aggravated robbery. 
The charge does not fit the circumstances. The officer was not shot nor the shotgun 
used in the commission of a robbery. Aggravated robbery requires that there be a 
robbery or an attempt to commit robbery. The motor vehicle was taken later and the 
record does not support reasonable reference that although Appellant still had the 
shotgun that he used it to take the vehicle. The taking of the vehicle is an aggravating 
circumstance to robbery. It cannot be robbery and the aggravating circumstance without 
another aggravating circumstance. The law does not support prior acts to the 
commission of the robbery and the record does not support a subsequent aggravating 
act. However, defense counsel did not move for directed verdict and therefore it can 
only be considered by this Court under the plan error exception. To the extent that this 




Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The standard has 
long been established. It is proven when performance is deficient as to fall below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and except for such deficient performance there 
is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. In 
this case, defense counsel was deficient due to certain oversights which included 
scrutinizing the jury instructions more closely, not allowing instruction No. 10 to name 
Jason Thomas specifically, making sure the burden of proof was articulated in the 
instruction on mental illness and pressing for exception to the trial court's refusal to give 
a special mitigation instruction. Next, the testimony of the alienists needed to be 
developed more completely to show Appellant's mental disorder with delusion and 
triggers for onset. Last, counsel should have moved for directed verdict at least as to 
the charge of aggravated robbery or object to the extent that the Court would have a 




THE JURY WAS NOT ADEQUATELY INSTRUCTED ON THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
AND SPECIAL MITIGATION FOR DIMINISHED CAPACITY AND THE JURY 
INSTRUCTION ON ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED MURDER WAS IMPROPER. 
The trial court attempted to instruct the jury pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 77-16a-102 (1953, as amended). At sub-section (2)(a) in pertinent part it reads: 
When a defendant asserts the mental defense pursuant to Section 76-3-305 or 
asserts special mitigation reducing the level of the offense pursuant to sub-
section 76-5-205.5 (1)(a), or when the evidence raises the issue and either party 
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requests the instruction, the jury shall be instructed that if it finds a defendant 
guilty of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of any charge, offense or lesser 
included offense, it shall also return a special verdict indicating whether it finds 
the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the offense. The jury was instructed 
accordingly in Instruction Number18, see the record at 415. 
While the jury instruction in this case appears to meet the statutory 
requirements, it fails to inform the jury as to the State having the burden of proof. The 
instruction does not designate that the State must establish by a preponderance of 
evidence that the Defendant was not mentally ill. 
This Court in State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, has under similar circumstances 
reversed and remanded for new trial when the trial court failed to give an adequate 
burden of proof instruction where an affirmative defense was asserted and found that 
the plain error doctrine applied. As in this case defense counsel did not object. The 
error, however, is not plain where there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial 
court, see State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah App 1997). However, the 
circumstances of Garcia closely parallel those of the instant case regarding procedural 
rules. That is, "the State must prove a criminal act beyond a reasonable doubt," State v. 
Knoll 712 P.2d 211 (Utah, 1985). Such burden remains on the State, whether 
defendant offers any evidence in an effort to prove affirmative defenses or not. State v. 
Torres, 619 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980). 
Not informing the jury of the burden of such proof made the instruction 
ambiguous and in light of the fact that there was confusion as to how the evidence was 
presented, the State initially calling the doctors involved as part of its case in chief, the 
jury was left to speculate upon whose burden it was to establish such proof. 
The Court attempted to rectify this by allowing counsel for the Appellant to 
proceed with questioning on direct examination. This only made speculation by the jury 
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more confusing. This is because the jury was neither advised nor properly instructed on 
this critical point. This was discussed outside the presence of the jury by counsel and 
the court, see trial transcript volume 3 at pages 31 to 54 in the record at 504. It resulted 
in a change of the questioning procedure with defense counsel now questioning Dr. 
Wootton on direct examination. While the Court did advise the jury that it was not the 
obligation of the Appellant to present evidence, Id at page 54, this explanation was 
insufficient to clarify the burden of proof. 
There was a general instruction, number 8, see the record at 404, given to the 
jury before evidence was presented on the first day of trial. This instruction informed the 
jury that the State had the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. It does not mention preponderance of evidence which is the standard required 
for proving that the Appellant was not mentally ill. As this Court asserted in Garcia, 
paragraph 12, the jury may acquit even though the evidence of the defense falls short 
of establishing justification or excuse by a preponderance of the evidence upon the 
subject, quoting State v. Vacos, 40 Utah 169, 181, 120 P. 497, 502 (1911). However, in 
this case the uncertainty of whose burden it was to prove mental illness or the lack 
thereof was left unresolved. 
The testimony of both doctors went uncontroverted to the point of mental illness 
and each commented upon the impact of voluntary intoxication. The instructions 
addressed adequately the matter of intoxication but were inadequate in advising the 
jury of it being the State's burden to prove no mental illness. Moreover, this question is 
not clarified in the special jury verdict form in the record at 427. It is noted that neither 
the general verdict form nor the special verdict form were signed by concurring jurors, 
see the record at 426 and 428; see also Exhibit E, Addendum attached. The trial court 
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asked if the verdict was unanimous and the foreperson responded that it was. See the 
trial transcript at volume 4 page 45 in the record at 505. However, defense counsel did 
not ask for the jury to be polled or examine the returned verdicts. Id at 46. 
Like in Garcia, the circumstances are the same where defense counsel did not 
object to the form of the jury instructions given. Therefore, review is limited. It must 
demonstrate plain error. To do so, the Appellant must show an error occurred that 
should have been obvious to the trial court and that prejudiced the outcome of his trial. 
Id at paragraph 17; see also State v. Litherland, 200 UT 76, paragraph 31, 12 p.3d 92. 
This Court has found obvious error in failing to instruct the jury about the burden of 
proof for self-defense in that case, and should find the same concerning the 
circumstances in this case. It also found such error harmful and like in Garcia which 
corroborates defendant's actions, in this case the testimony of the two court appointed 
alienists confirmed mental illness whose testimony went uncontroverted. 
Instruction No. 10 was improper in that it named JASON THOMAS specifically in 
the elements portion of the instruction. In light of the circumstances, this allowed the 
jury to be influenced by sympathy, passion or factors in close connection with the victim 
even though it was instructed to not be influenced by such in Instruction No. 2, in the 
record at 398. It was not necessary to identify the victim by name to properly instruct 
the jury any more for aggravated murder than it was necessary to identify the victims by 
name in instruction numbers 11, 12, 13 or 14 where specific names were properly 
excluded. Notwithstanding the fact that the Appellant was found guilty of Count 2 
pursuant to a properly worded instruction, it cannot be presumed that the same verdict 
would have resulted in Count 1 if it had not specifically named Jason Thomas. In this 
case, careful instruction was warranted in light of the number of alternatives the jury 
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was obliged to consider as lesser offenses. 
There is also to consider the trial court's ruling about the instruction on special 
mitigation requested by counsel for Appellant. Objection was made and the trial court 
ruled there were insufficient facts presented to justify instructing the jury with regard to 
that issue. See trial transcript, volume 4 at page 4 in the record at 505. This was 
inconsistent with the trial court's previous statement that it's not the obligation of the 
defendant to present any evidence. See trial transcript, volume 3, at page 54 in the 
record at 504. Moreover, the special mitigation instruction was appropriate to offer in 
light of the evidence presented by both alienists who found Appellant suffered from 
delusion among other forms of mental illness. While the trial court judge indicated that 
the proposed instruction was attached to the record, this attorney was unable to find it 
but must assume from the dialogue that it was patterned after Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 76-5-205.5 (1953, as amended). 
A similar situation was addressed in State v. Marshall, 2005 UT App 269. In that 
case, this Court reasserted the position of the Utah Supreme Court that, "while a party 
who fails to object to or give an instruction may have an instruction assigned as error 
under the manifest injustice exception, a party cannot take advantage of an error 
committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error". Id at 
paragraph 5. It went on to state that a jury instruction may not be assigned as error 
even if such instruction constitutes manifest injustice if counsel, either by statement or 
act, affirmatively represented to the trial court that he or she had no objection to the jury 
instruction. Unlike Marshall, where it is noted that both parties actively represented to 
the trial court in chambers that the instructions were acceptable, in this case the trial 
court asked if there were objections just prior to considering defense counsel's jury 
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instruction on special mitigation. See the trial transcript, volume 4 at page 3. This is not 
the same as actually representing his acceptance. 
In light of the inadequacy of properly identifying the burden of proof or for special 
mitigation and instructing the jury of the elements in Count 1 by identifying the victim by 
name, jury instructions in this case were in error and Appellant asserts that the same 
caused his conviction or from inadequate consideration on the issue of mental illness 
an adequate opportunity to have consider lesser offenses and should therefore be 
remanded for new trial or the jury verdicts reversed. 
B. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Prior to trial, a motion to suppress was brought. This Court in State v. Carter, 
2006 UT App 460 considered a similar motion but concerning a different charge. It 
stated that "the grant or denial of a motion to dismiss is a question of law, reviewed for 
correctness, giving no deference to the decision of the trial court. Id at paragraph 6. 
See also State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT22, at paragraph 17, 70 P.3d 111. It also stated 
"as a general rule, it will not consider an issue, including a constitutional argument, 
raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or the case 
involved exceptional circumstances, quoting State v. Brower, 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah 
App 1993). 
In this case, an evidentiary hearing was held and points and authorities were 
submitted. Items of personal property were collected by law enforcement and 
statements made by Appellant were later used at trial. The trial court in its decision 
notes the standard but does not apply it correctly. This is particularly disconcerting to 
the extent as it pertains to warantless search. 
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In State v. Strain 779 P.2d 221,#224 (Utah 1989) the Utah Supreme Court noted 
that waiver of one's right to remain silent must be executed with full awareness of the 
nature of the right being abandoned and of the consequences of the decision to 
abandon it. See also Miran v. Burbine 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). A waiver of miranda 
rights must be voluntary, see Strain at 224 (quoting Miran, at 421). The trial court saw 
no issue as to whether the post-Miranda statements were voluntary in this case but it 
does not adequately address the concern for deception. In a footnote the trial court 
judge points out that he is troubled by the way the officer enticed the Appellant, telling 
him that honestly wouldn't hurt him since this contradicted the Miranda warning that 
anything Appellant said could be used against him in court. See the record at 283; see 
also Exhibit B, Addendum attached. The judge, however, noted that notwithstanding the 
officer's interrogation tactics he was still persuaded based on the remaining 
circumstances that the Appellant's waiver was knowing and intelligent. The Appellant 
disagrees. 
In State v. Barnett, 2006 UT App 417, this Court addressed suppression for both 
post-Miranda and pre-Miranda statements much in the same way the trial court did in 
the present case. In reviewing situations where absent any coercion during the first 
unwarned admission, a defendant's subsequent statements are admissible if they were 
voluntarily made after a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights. Id at 
paragraph 8. However, unlike that case there was no clear waiver because of the 
equivocal responses made by Appellant. Also, since it was the pre-Miranda statement 
of the Appellant, "Is he alright?" that was introduced at trial and no similar post-Miranda 
admissions, this one is difficult to characterize as harmless error like this Court found in 
Barnett. See Barnett at paragraph 16. Compare trial transcript, volume 2, at pages 155-
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61, in the record at 506. 
The officer did not respond to the Appellant's attempt to obtain more information 
before proceeding. The Appellant had a right to know what consequences he would be 
facing. Instead, the officer used each instance under the pretext of honesty and 
favorable treatment if he cooperated to get the Appellant to confess. The tactics 
employed by the officer were subtle but effective given Appellant's condition and the 
circumstances. The officer provided him with a blanket and hot chocolate after he had 
been wet, cold and disoriented from the weather, the circumstances and the arrest. The 
officer noticed that his teeth were chattering when the interrogation began. These 
gestures of caring for the Appellant would not have been inappropriate had he not used 
them as an interrogation ploy. However, showing concern was pretextual and that is 
evident by the immediacy of the interrogation, particularly in light of the fact that it 
occurred in the early morning hours of the following day. Id. However, the trial court 
judge failed to consider these factors in proper context. Instead, he reached his 
conclusions from the inconsistent action and statements made by the Appellant during 
the interrogation which only made more evident the confusion the Appellant manifested. 
Had the trial court placed the statements in context with timing and circumstance, it 
would have likely concluded that such waiver was not made knowingly and intelligently. 
As to the alleged search without warrant but by consent of the Appellant's 
bedroom, testimony runs contrary and inconsistent. The trial court judge chose to 
believe the testimony of law enforcement when the owner of the premises, the father of 
the Appellant, testified that he did not fully understand everything that was asked. 
When he asked the officers to get a warrant they continued to search. There is no 
probable cause or exigent circumstance. This Court in State v. Duran, 2005 UT App 
21 
409 set forth what is expected in circumstances concerning warantless searches. Like 
in that case, a family member with common authority allegedly consented. Concerning 
such authority it stated: 
Finding common authority of the property by persons generally having join access or 
control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the 
cohabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others 
have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be 
searched. Id at paragraph 11. 
This requires a shared use that simply did not exist in the instant case. 
Appellant's personal property was not property with other having joint access in his 
bedroom any more than that which was found not in Duran. Moreover, there is even a 
less persuasive reason for asserting that the officers reasonably relied upon this 
apparent authority. There was no reason for law enforcement to be there except to 
determine if the Appellant was there. Once that determination was made that he was 
not, law enforcement inappropriately used entry as reason to stay when asked to leave. 
As stated by this Court in State v. Vallasenor, 2005 UT App 65, it depends upon the 
circumstances as then existed at the time the search is made and for exigent 
circumstances it is an objective determination. The guiding principle in reasonableness, 
examined in light of the facts known to the officers at the time they acted. Id at 
paragraph 10 and 15. In this case, they misled the Appellant's father into believing they 
were only searching for him. The trial court judge frankly adopted the course of familiar 
trappings of believing the word of law enforcement over the one having this 
fundamental and constitutional right against such unauthorized intrusion. This misses 
the point. That way of ruling upon evidence and weighing it as though it were deferential 
to a fact finder's discretion each time contrary to the interests of such fundamental 
protection disregards the protected rights of all property owners and gives law 
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enforcement an unfettered hand in perpetuating questionable search and seizure 
practices. It is a scenario repeated too often to allow it to go unchecked. Whatever the 
circumstances, the officer will always feel that such steps or action are necessary to 
their urgent investigation. Granted, the circumstances in this case are serious in their 
nature. However, that should not compromise what has long been established as 
protected interests against unauthorized intrusion especially where as in this case it 
would not have been a hardship upon law enforcement to simply secure a warrant. 
Consequently, the Appellant asserts that the trial court judge erred in denying his 
motion to suppress such evidence and testimony. 
C. 
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT APPELLANT ON AGGRAVATED 
ROBBERY 
The charge of aggravated robbery is set forth in Utah Code Annotated, Section 
76-6-302 (1953, as amended). Upon first impression it seems to apply to the 
circumstances. However, in closer review the evidence in the case falls short simply 
because it does not apply. Each subsection seems to have some application in 
examining the circumstances. Subsection (1) reads as follows: 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in section 76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle. 
In the present case, the evidence supports use of a dangerous weapon as a 
loaded shotgun would certainly qualify. It also supports the finding of causing serious 
bodily injury upon another. Close range shots to the chest, neck, head and shoulders 
are well established. Moreover, the evidence supports the finding that an operable 
motor vehicle was taken. What is not supported in the evidence is the primary element 
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of the charge, "committing robbery". The Appellant was not in the course of committing 
robbery when the officer approached. A robbery was not in progress when the officer 
responded. Subsection (2) makes aggravated robbery a first degree felony because 
robbery is a second degree felony. It becomes aggravated by doing one of the three 
aggravating qualifications in the course of committing robbery. In other words, there 
must be a robbery before considering the aggravating circumstances. That simply did 
not happen in this case from the evidence presented. This brings the matter to sub-
paragraph 3 which states: 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course of 
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in 
the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery. 
Again, the circumstances fall short in applying this primary element which is 
attempt, commission or flight from the commission of a robbery. Even though in this 
case, the evidence supports each and every alternative for aggravation, including the 
taking of an operable motor vehicle, the taking of the vehicle is not what is 
contemplated under the statute as the robbery. While the Appellant allegedly still had 
the gun while taking the vehicle of those assisting the record does not establish that the 
gun was used against them to take it. The only inference that can be drawn to support 
the jury's verdict is to conclude that taking a vehicle was what constituted the robbery 
and it was aggravated by threatening to use a dangerous weapon or causing serious 
bodily injury to the officer. However, these events transpired prior to attempting to 
commit, during the commission or after the attempt or commission of the taking of the 
1. The two who testified at trial, CHRISTINE TALLMAN and PEDRO HINOJOSA, stated that Appellant 
never pointed the gun at them. Ms. Tallman, who is Appellant's cousin, was about five feet away when 
Appellant ordered her to drive. She ran instead. That makes for a difficult inference to draw from the 
evidence since it is unlikely she would have responded that way had he turned the shotgun upon her. 
Since this is such a critical point of consideration, counsel has included excerpts from both witnesses at 
Exhibit C, Addendum attached. 
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vehicle. This tortures the language to include prior acts as part of the course of 
committing robbery which makes such inference an unreasonable one to consider. 
Remanding the matter for retrial will not likely change the facts or circumstances 
regarding this charge. The sequence of events are not likely to change with a new trial 
and sufficient evidence was established to call into question any subsequent 
inconsistent sequence. To the contrary the appropriate resolution seems to be for 
directed verdict although in this case counsel for Appellant did not make that motion. To 
the extent that the issue was not one reserved for appeal, Appellant contends that the 
same is one of plain error and the facts and circumstances are sufficiently marshalled 
to consider as an insufficiency of evidence claim. 
D. 
APPELLANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT TRIAL 
Ineffective assistance of counsel is one of three exceptions to the preservation 
rule considered by this Court. See State v. Hansen, 2001 UT App 14, paragraph 3; see 
also State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah App 1996). However, to successfully claim 
ineffective assistance, Appellant must: 
(i) identify specify acts or omissions by counsel that fall below the standard of 
reasonable professional assistance, and 
(ii) demonstrate that counsel's error prejudiced Appellant. See State v. Parker, 
2000 UT 51, paragraph 10, 4 P.3d 778. 
In Hansen, this Court found the defendant's trial counsel was deficient failing to 
request a jury instruction on two statutory defenses. Hansen, 2001 UT App 14 at 
paragraph 8. However, due to its finding that there was no reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable outcome, a fact sensitive conclusion, it found harmless error. The 
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circumstances in the present case are distinguishable for the reasons asserted above. 
One can always find points of criticism in reviewing the trial work of another 
attorney. The standard for review requires that there be more than simply making a 
mistake. It contemplates a performance that is so deficient as to fall below an objective 
standard of reasonableness. It must offer reasonable probability that the outcome of the 
trial would have been different. Appellant was deprived of this right when his attorney's 
conduct so undermined the proper function of the adversarial process that the 
proceedings could not be relied on to produce a just result. In the instant case, this 
occurred by a series of oversights. First, counsel should have scrutinized the proposed 
jury instructions more closely. While Appellant asserts that the errors committed in 
faulty instructions fall into a category of plain error, counsel's failure to address to some 
extent invited error as is often the case by such oversight. Therefore, it will likely not be 
reversed or remanded unless this Court finds such oversight error as coming within the 
manifest injustice exception. See State v. Marshall, 2005 UT App 269 at paragraph 5. 
See also State v. Geukqeuzian, 2004 UT 16, paragraph 19, 86 P.3d 742. 
Second, more evidence could have been developed from the testimony of the 
doctors regarding Appellant's delusional state. Each doctor commented through 
testimony and through assessment that Appellant's mental illness included delusions, 
one diagnosing it to be an alcohol-induced psychotic disorder with hallucinations and 
the other alcohol-induced psychotic disorder with delusions and a schizoaffective 
disorder of the depressed type. 
Third, counsel for Appellant should have moved for directed verdict regarding 
Count 2, aggravated robbery. As mentioned, these are oversights and therefore difficult 
to explain away as a calculated strategy. In fact, there is no strategy that would warrant 
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not objecting under the circumstances. However, it was due to these oversights that 
rendered such performance as ineffective and it is probable that had they not been 
made the outcome of the trial would have been different. 
CONCLUSION 
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above, the Appellant requests that 
the matter be remanded with instructions or reversed the verdict of the jury together 
with such other and further relief as to this Co*frt appears equitable and proper. 
DATED this /Z&V o f /(//^<^ ^ ^ 
J. BRYAW7JACKSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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SCOTT F. GARRETT (#8687) 
Iron County Attorney 
82 North 100 East, Suite 201 
P.O. Box 428 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (435)865-^310 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
BRYAN FEATHERHAT, ; 
Defendant. ] 
) JUDGMENT, FINDINGS, SENTENCE, 
AND COMMITMENT 
> Criminal No. 071500011 
I Judge G. Michael Westfall 
The Defendant, BRYAN FEATHERHAT, having been convicted on November 20, 2008, 
pursuant to a jury trial and verdicts of guilty, of the offenses of ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED 
MURDER, a First-Degree Felony, and AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First-Degree Felony, and the 
Court having entered said verdicts of guilty and having ordered the preparation of a presentence 
investigation report, and after said report was prepared and presented to the Court, the above-entitled 
matter having come on for sentencing on January 20, 2009, and the Defendant, BRYAN 
FEATHERHAT, having appeared before the Court in person, together with his attorney of record 
Jack B. Burns, and the State of Utah having appeared by and through Iron County Attorney Scott F. 
Garrett, and the Court having reviewed the presentence investigation report and the file in detail, and 
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having further heard statements from all parties and being fully advised in the premises, now makes 
and enters the following Judgment, Findings, Sentence, and Commitment, to wit: 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, pursuant to his guilty plea, 
the Defendant, BRYAN FEATHERHAT, has been convicted of the offenses of ATTEMPTED 
AGGRAVATED MURDER, a First-Degree Felony, and AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First-
Degree Felony; and the Court having asked whether the Defendant had anything to say in regard to 
why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or 
appearing to the Court, it is adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as charged and convicted. 
FINDINGS 
In determining whether to run the Defendant's convictions consecutively or concurrently, the 
Court made the following findings, to wit: 
1. The Court found that the gravity of the offense of Attempted Aggravated Murder, a 
First-Degree Felony, was sufficient to justify consecutive sentences. The Court indicated that it 
could not think of more grave conduct than firing a shotgun at point-blank range and then continuing 
to shoot at the officer as he attempted to flee. Moreover, the Court found that, but for the bullet-
proof vest which Officer Thomas was wearing at the time of the incident, Officer Thomas would 
have died from the gunshot wounds. 
2. Additionally, the Court found that the offenses involved multiple victims and that 
each of the counts involved totally separate victims. Therefore, the Court determined that this factor 
also supported the order of consecutive sentences. 
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3. Further, the Court considered the Defendant's rehabilitative needs and determined 
that the Defendant needs rehabilitation; that the Defendant acknowledged he needs rehabilitation; 
that his history bears that out; and the Defendant's family also acknowledged that the Defendant 
needs rehabilitation. 
4. The Court found that the Utah State Prison is the appropriate place for the Defendant 
to obtain his treatment and that this case is an appropriate case for consecutive sentences. 
SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendant, BRYAN 
FEATHERHAT, and pursuant to his conviction of ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED MURDER, a 
First-Degree Felony, is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment in the Utah State 
Prison for a period of not less than five (5) years and which may be for life, and the Defendant is 
hereby placed in the custody of the Utah State Department of Corrections. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, BRYAN FEATHERHAT, and pursuant 
to his conviction of ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED MURDER, a First-Degree Felony, shall pay 
a fine in the sum and amount often thousand dollars ($10,000), plus an eighty-five percent (85%) 
surcharge, and a court security fee in the sum and amount of twenty-five dollars ($25). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, BRYAN FEATHERHAT, and pursuant 
to his conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First-Degree Felony, is hereby sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of imprisonment in the Utah State Prison for a period of not less than five (5) 
years and which may be for life, and the Defendant is hereby placed in the custody of the Utah State 
Department of Corrections. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, BRYAN FEATHERHAT, and pursuant 
to his conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First-Degree Felony, shall pay a fine in the sum 
and amount often thousand dollars ($10,000), plus an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge, and a 
court security fee in the sum and amount of twenty-five dollars ($25). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, BRYAN FEATHERHAT, shall pay 
restitution in the amount of twenty-four thousand two hundred forty-one dollars and sixty cents 
($24,241.60) (specifically, as follows: the amount of $22,156.50 to TPA for Utah Local 
Governments Trust; the amount of $1,628.10 to the Cedar City Police Depanment; and the amount 
of $457.00 to Workers Compensation Fund). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the sentences set forth herein shall be served 
consecutively. 
COMMITMENT 
TO THE SHERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH: 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, BRYAN FEATHERHAT, and 
deliver him to the Utah State Department of Corrections in Draper, Utah, there to be kept and 
confined in accordance with the above and foregoing Judgment, Findings, Sentence, and 
Commitment. ^,A f /__ 
DATED this (7 day of F^bnlary, 2009. 
BY THE C Q U p 
' G./K4JCHAEL WESTFALL 
District Court Judge 
4 -
CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF IRON ) 
I, CAROLYN SMITHERMAN, Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron 
County, State of Utah, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true, and exact copy of the original 
Judgment, Findings, Sentence, and Commitment in the case entitled State of Utah vs. Bryan 
Featherhat Criminal No, 071500011, now on file and of record in my office. 
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said office in Cedar City, County of Iron, State of Utah, 
this / / day of F^te&ary, 2009. 
E 
h \ CAROLYN SMITHERMAN District Clerk* of Court 
I BV: 7r\\hii& yH/%uUii (SE:ALV:),/:::;^?I|| y=r; j \ \.,M^ J^ci By: //)(/{/ek*. / \t AJVWV 
'V,c £Jf District Deputy Clerk of Court 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I hand-delivered a full, true, and correct copy of the within and 
foregoing JUDGMENT, FINDINGS, SENTENCE, AND COMMITMENT, on this / / • day 
of February, 2009, to Jack B. Burns, Attorney for Defendant, at the office of the Iron County 
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DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART 
AND DENYING IN PART 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 071500011 
Judge G. Michael Westfall 
On November 5, 2007, Defendant Bryan Featherhat moved to suppress the evidence 
obtained during a search of his residence and the statements he made to police and/or other state 
agents. On January 14, 2008, an evidentiary hearing was held on the Motion to Suppress. On 
March 24, 2008, Defendant filed a memorandum in support of the Motion. On April 2, 2008, the 
State filed a memorandum responding to the Motion. On April 10, 2008, Defendant filed a reply 
memorandum in support of the Motion. On May 27, 2008, at a review hearing, counsel verbally 
requested that the Motion be submitted for decision. As explained below, the Motion is granted 
in part and denied in part. 
BACKGROUND 
Based on the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing on the Motion, the Court finds 
000265 
the following facts:1 
A. Defendant's Initial Statements to Law Enforcement 
On January 5, 2007, the Cedar City Police Department received a report that one of their 
officers had been shot with a 12-gauge shotgun. Based on the report, local law enforcement 
began searching for Defendant as a suspect. 
On January 6, 2007, at about 4:00 a.m., Cedar City police officers Matthew Topham and 
Tim Bonzo located Defendant on Old Highway 91 in Iron County. 
Officer Topham encountered Defendant first, and shined his spotlight at him. Defendant 
immediately raised his hands in the air. 
Asked what his name was, Defendant responded, "Bryan," at which time the officer 
pointed his .40 caliber service pistol at him. Defendant confirmed that his name was Bryan 
Featherhat, turned around, and complied with the officer's instruction to lie down. 
About this time, Detective Bonzo arrived, and instantly trained his shotgun on Defendant. 
Without administering Miranda warnings, and while the officers still had their weapons 
aimed at Defendant, Officer Topham asked Defendant where his (Defendant's) shotgun was. 
This question was motivated, at least in part, by Officer Topham's concern for his own and 
Detective Bonzo's safety. 
1
 For convenience, some of the facts included below are taken verbatim, or with only 
slight modifications, from the fact statements respectively presented by the parties. 
2 
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Defendant responded that it was up in the mountains. 
B. Defendant's Interrogation 
Within about an hour of his arrest. Defendant was transported to an interrogation room at 
the Cedar City Police Department.2 The interrogating officer, Detective Mike Bleak, began by 
taking an active interest in making Defendant comfortable. He inquired whether Defendant, 
whose clothes had been frozen and covered with snow at the time of his arrest, was warming up. 
(4:48:25-4:48:30).3 At Defendant's request, Detective Bleak brought him some water and 
adjusted Defendant's handcuffs. Additionally, Detective Bleak gave Defendant some hot 
chocolate and put a blanket over his shoulders. (4:48:50-4:54:55). 
Next, Detective Bleak requested that Defendant give him certain identifying and contact 
information, including his name, address, phone number, date of birth, and social security 
number. Defendant gave_ all of the requested information, and Detective Bleak wrote, it down, 
within less than two minutes. (4:55:19-4:56:36). 
Then the following conversation occurred: 
Detective Bleak: Alright, well Bryan, I'm sure you know why you're here 
2
 Officer Topham testified, and the Court finds, that Defendant was arrested at about 4:00 
a.m. The time shown at the beginning of the video of the interrogation is about 4:48. Detective 
Bleak testified, and the Court finds, that the time shown on the video is accurate. 
3




tonight. And let me just start out by telling you this, alright? I know that—that 
there's two sides to every story, and I know that every— 
Defendant: Is he alright?4 
Detective Bleak: What's that? 
Defendant: Is he alright? 
Detective Bleak: Yeah, yeah, he is—he's going to be alright. But I know—I 
mean, there's two sides to every story. And, it's just important for us to, uh, just 
get to the bottom of it—figure out why, you know, try and understand what led 
you to this, and I guess the thing that we're probably most concerned of, Bryan, is 
that when you get—somebody gets to this point, obviously you need some kind of 
help with something, and you know that—it's unfortunate that it has to go to these 
extremes to try and get you some help, but you knowjthat's kind of the point 
we're at now—that's something we might be able to offer you. Um, and as we 
talk, I—I don't expect, I don't want you to make anything up, but, all I—all I 
want's the truth. The truth is something that's—that's really going to help you out 
4
 Detective Bleak testified, and the Court finds, that he understood the "he" in 
Defendant's question to refer to Officer Jason Thomas, the Cedar City police officer allegedly 
shot by Defendant the night before the interrogation. That Defendant's question was intended to 
refer to Officer Thomas is also evident later in the interrogation, when Detective Bleak discusses 
this question with Defendant, and expressly states that Defendant was referring to Officer 
Thomas, which Defendant does not deny. (5:28:45-5:32:27). 
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in the long run. And I'm—Fm not blowing smoke up you're a**, I'm here to be 
straight with you,'and as long as—you're straight with me, Fm straight with you, 
*kay? Uh, as we're talking (clears throat), and bef—and before I ask you any 
questions, I just wanna make sure that you understand what your rights are, okay? 
Uh, first of all, you have the right to remain silent. And anything you say can and 
will be used in court against you. You have the right to an attorney and have him 
present during any questioning. And if you can't afford an attorney, one can be 
provided to you by the court. Do you understand those rights okay, Bryan? 
Defendant: Yeah. 
Detective Bleak: Okay, with those rights in mind, do you want to tell me your 
side of the story? 
Defendant: Well, it's just like, I don't know, I've just been hearing a lot of stuff, 
you know?5 
Detective Bleak: What kind of stuff? 
Defendant: Like, to the breaking point where I either commit suicide or—it's 
like, everything, like everything is talking to me, like God's talking to me and, it's 
like (inaudible) over the radio and stuff and I don't know if it's me putting the 
3
 Defendant incorrectly states that he said, "Well, I don't know, we did a lot of stuff you 
know." Mem. in Supp. at 3. 
5 
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heads in my own thought or whatever and stuff, and just like, I don't know, it just 
told me to murder. I don't know if it was the music telling me to do it or what. 
(4-56-40-4:59:05). 
A little over a half-hour later in the interview, after Defendant had said, among other 
things, that he could not remember a lot of what had happened the night before, the conversation 
continued as follows: 
Detective Bleak: Was [the gun] laying on the seat? 
Defendant: Will this help me in court?6 
Detective Bleak: It'll—it-
Defendant: Or will it help you guys? 
Detective Bleak: Dude, I'll be honest with you. Honesty goes a long way for 
everyone involved. I'll tell you that straight up. Honesty goes a long way-with 
the prosecutor, with the judge-nobody wants to go into court and listen to some 
b.s., dude, ah, ah, and that's the truth. Honesty goes a long way-with me, 
with-with the judge, with the prosecutor. I mean, I—I'll be honest with you. I 
mean it's-we've got all the evidence in the world of what happened. The-the 
thing that we're missing, the thing that-that we're just trying to understand is-is 
6
 Defendant incorrectly states that his question was, "Will they send me to court?" Mem. 
in Supp. at 3. 
6 
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what was going on. What-I mean everybody's got-there's two sides to every 
story, there's-there's two versions to every story, and we've got all sorts of pieces 
here (Clears throat.) The only things we're missing is your version. This is your 
opportunity to tell us what's going on-tell us what you were thinking. I mean 
this—this is your one opportunity Bryan. This is-this is-this is the only time you 
and I are going to talk, 'kay? And this is the opportunity, you know, for me to go 
to the prosecutor and say, "Hey, Bryan jerked me around" or (inaudible) "Bryan 
was straight up honest, and let's get this guy some help," and that's no bullsh**, 
that's straight up. At this point, you're gonna do nothing but help yourself in the 
long run, man. And that's-that's honest. I—I—I just want to know what happened. 
I want to understand, Bryan-you wanna-what happened there tonight. And I 
know that you know. I know you can remember-'cuz that's-I mean that's a pretty 
traumatic thing-I-I know that you can remember. Bryan, start-start with me from 
when you reached in the truck and got the gun and just tell me what happened. 
Defendant: (Coughs.) Is this like a confession or . . . ? 
Detective Bleak: This is just me trying to understand. 
Defendant: You might think I'm crazy and stuff, but-you know, I wouldn't-I, 
you know, I just told you it was the music and stuff, and it was like-you know, it 
told me-it told me to shoot him and stuff. 
7 
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(5 36 20-5 40 20) 
In the course of the interview, Defendant failed to answer a number of Detective Bleak s 
questions choosing instead to remain silent 
Toward the end of the interview, Defendant was reminded again that his statement would 
be forwarded to the prosecutor Detective Bleak stated 
Well, at this point, we put a case togethei last night a little bit and the Judge has already 
seen the initial report and the Judge issued a warrant foi your arrest So that's you re 
gonna be arrested on a warrant and booked into jail Like I said I told you earlier, 
honesty goes a long way with us That's something that's definitely gonna get passed on 
to the prosecutor He'll deal with it from here on out Alright9 
(6 23 27-6 23 58) 
Defendant did not respond to that statement or the invitation to comment 
C. Search of Defendant's Bedroom 
On the evening of January 5, 2007, shortly after the shooting, Detective Dustm Orton and 
other Cedar City police officers visited the home of Defendant's parents, where Defendant was 
then residing Defendant's father, Harlan Featherhat, met Detective Orton at the front door and, 
in response to the detective's inquiry, stated that Defendant was not there Detective Orton 
informed Harlan that the officers weie looking for Defendant in connection with a shooting 
incident, and asked whether the police could come in and search for him and other items Harlan 
8 
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consented, telling Detective Orton that the police could look for anything they needed.7 
Defendant's mother was present during this exchange, and at no time manifested any opposition 
to Detective Orton's request to search. 
Accordingly, the officers went through the home and confirmed that Defendant was not 
there. In the process of looking for Defendant, Detective Orton recovered some items that were 
in plain view in Defendant's bedroom. Detective Orton's search did not extend beyond anything 
in plain view. 
Soon after the police had searched the home for Defendant, Detective Bonzo arrived. 
Informed by Detective Orton that Defendant's parents had verbally consented to a search of the 
home, Detective Bonzo proceeded to conduct a thorough search of Defendant's bedroom, and 
recovered a number of items from desk drawers and the closet area. Detective Bonzo spoke with 
Harlan, at least once during the search, and again before leaving, showing Harlan the items 
recovered from Defendant's bedroom. At no time did Harlan manifest any opposition to the 
officers' presence or to the search, and he affirmatively approved of them taking the items they 
had found.8 
7
 The testimony on this point was conflicting. Detective Orton testified that he asked for, 
and was given, consent to search the home for Defendant and other items. Harlan testified that 
the detective only requested, and that he only gave, consent to search for Defendant. The Court 
finds the detective's testimony here more credible than that of Harlan. 
8
 Again, the testimony here was conflicting. The testimony from Detective Orton and 




A. Defendant's Initial Statements to Law Enforcement 
The State acknowledges that Defendant was in custody at the time Officer Topham 
questioned him regarding the location of his shotgun, and concedes that Defendant's response to 
this question should be suppressed because no Miranda10 warnings preceded it See State's 
Response to Defendant's Motion to Suppress ("Response") at 5 Consequently, although the 
Court does not necessarily agree that Miranda warnings were required prior to Officer Topham's 
inquiry, see, e_g_, United States v Lackey, 334 F 3d 1224 (10th Cir 2003) (public safety 
exception justified officers m asking defendant, after arrest but prior to giving Miranda warnings, 
had confirmed that Defendant was not at the home, he asked Detective Orton if they were done 
searching, and that Detective Orton responded that they were not done because Defendant's 
bedroom was "a crime scene " Additionally, Harlan testified that, after Detective Bonzo had 
been searching Defendant's bedroom for 15-20 minutes, Harlan expressly told Detective Orton 
that he wanted the officers to obtain a search warrant According to Harlan, Detective Orton 
relayed this information to Detective Bonzo, who said that he only needed to search for a few 
more minutes Harlan testified that he then told Detective Bonzo to get a search warrant anyway, 
but that Detective Bonzo went back into the room and came out about five minutes later, saying 
that the officers would bnng a search warrant by the home the next day, which the officers never 
did Defendant's half-sister, Amber Picyavit, gave testimony that was somewhat similar to that 
of Harlan, but also somewhat conflicting Suffice it to say that the Court finds the detectives' 
testimony to be more credible than that of Harlan and Ms Picyavit 
9
 Additional facts are included in the discussion below as necessary 
10
 See Miranda v Arizona, 384 U S 436(1966) 
10 
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question regarding presence of weapons); State v. Kooyman, 112 P.3d 1252, 1263 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2005) (during execution of search warrant, ''officer's brief questions about the presence of 
weapons in the home did not implicate Miranda"* where the inquiry was motivated by safety 
concerns, and where there was ''nothing precluding a conclusion that the question was 'normally 
attendant to . . . custody,v) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)) (other 
citations omitted), Defendant's Motion to Suppress is granted as to his initial statement regarding 
the shotgun's location. 
B. Defendant's Interrogation 
1. Defendant's Pre-Miranda Question About Officer Thomas 
Defendant argues that his inquiry regarding whether Officer Thomas was alright should 
be suppressed because "Defendant had not been given his Miranda rights, was in custody and 
was in the process of being interrogated." Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress 
("Mem. in Supp.") at 6. 
In response, the State argues that such inquiry is admissible as a spontaneous, voluntary 
statement See Response at 9 (citing State v. Meinhart 617 P.2d 355 (Utah 1980); State v. 
Easthope, 510 P.2d 933 (Utah 1973)). 
Defendant challenges this description, asserting that "in light of the amount of time [he] 
was in custody, the length of time [he] was questioned before Miranda rights were given and the 
11 
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['false friend' and half truth'] tactics[11] used by the interrogating officei, the Defendant s 
statements pre- Muanda cannot accurately be described as voluntary or spontaneous " Reply at 3 
The question here is whethei Defendant is correct in asseiting that he "was in the piocess 
of being interrogated" at the time he asked about Officer Thomas The Court answers this 
question in the negative, concluding that, at the time of Defendant's inquiry about Officer 
Thomas, Defendant was not "subjected to either express questioning or its functional 
equivalent " Koovman 112 P 3d at 1262 (citations and quotation marks omitted) 
As stated by the Supreme Court in Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291, 64 L Ed 
2d 297, 100 S Ct 1682 (1980), an encounter is considered to be an interrogation 
if an officer uses "any words or actions (other than those normally attendant to 
arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response from the suspect " Id_ at 301 Therefore, if a police 
officer's questions or comments are "normally attendant to custody" or are not 
"reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response," the Miranda warnings are 
not required Id. at 301 Consequently, any statement made by a defendant under 
these circumstances is considered voluntary and untainted See id at 301-02 
Koovman, 112 P 3d at 1262-63 
Nothing that Detective Bleak said or did prior to Defendant asking about Officer Thomas 
was "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response " Id_ Defendant points to "the amount 
of time [he] was in custody," Reply at 3, and "the length of time [he] was questioned before 
11
 Defendant argues that Detective Bleak "went out of his way to appear as a fnend to the 
defendant by making statements such as CI know there are two sides to every story,'" and by 
stating that he was primarily interested in getting Defendant help Reply at 2-3 The latter 
statement was made after Defendant had asked whether Officer Thomas was alright 
12 
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Miranda rights were given," Reply at 3, but he had only been in custody for about an hour and he 
had only been asked questions (all of which were permissible)12 for a couple of minutes. 
Defendant has presented no authorities holding that Miranda warnings must be given within any 
particular time-frame, and the Court cannot conclude that the brief custodial period leading up to 
Defendant's inquiry here added significantly to the coercion "inherent in custody itself." State v 
James, 858 P.2d 1012, 1016 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("Interrogation must reflect a greater measure 
of compulsion than that inherent in custody itself.") (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479) 
Similarly, the Court rejects Defendant's argument that his statement was not voluntary or 
spontaneous merely because Detective Bleak said that he knew there were "two sides to every 
story."13 Detective Bleak's comment did not call for a response, and he was not expecting one, 
12
 As the State has noted, all of the pre-Miranda questions asked by Detective Bleak were 
typical of questions "normally attendant to arrest and custody." See State v. Dutchie, 969 P.2d 
422, 426-27 (Utah 1998). 
13
 Defendant also condemns as a "false friend" or "half truth" tactic Detective Bleak's 
statement suggesting that his primary interest was in getting Defendant help. See Reply at 3 
(citing State v. Tiedemannu 162 P.3d 1106 (Utah 2007)). It is unclear whether Defendant intends 
this argument to apply to his argument that Detective Bleak's "tactics" show that Defendant's 
question about Officer Thomas was involuntary, see Reply at 3, but if so, the argument is 
rejected. As noted above, Detective Bleak had not yet made this statement at the time Defendant 
asked about Officer Thomas, so even assuming that the statement was improper, it could not 
have affected the voluntariness of Defendant's question. It is likewise unclear whether 
Defendant is arguing that his question was involuntary because Detective Bleak had given him 
water, hot chocolate, and a blanket, but if so, this argument is also rejected. See People v. Logan, 
797 N.Y.S.2d 634, 636 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (defendant who was given a blanket, water, and a 
cigarette was not coerced or intimidated into making a statement). 
13 
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as shown by the fact that Defendant interrupted the detective to ask about Officer Thomas 
Having reviewed the video of the entire conversation, the Court has no difficulty finding, under 
the totality of the circumstances, that Defendant's question about Officer Thomas was indeed 
spontaneous and voluntary, and that it is therefore admissible under Miranda itself. See Dutchie, 
969 P.2d at 426 (defendant's statements were admissible where they "were voluntary, 
spontaneous, and not the product of interrogation") (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478). Hence, as 
to this statement, the Motion to Suppress is denied. 
2. Defendant's Post-Miranda Statements 
The next issue raised by Defendant with regard to the interrogation is whether the State 
has carried its "heavy burden" of "demonstrating] that [he] knowingly and intelligently waived 
his Miranda rights." State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah 1997) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. 
at 475) (quotation marks omitted). The Court must "look at the totality of the circumstances to 
determine if a suspect has made a valid waiver." Leyva, 951 P.2d at 744 (citation and quotation 
marks omitted). 
Defendant's argument begins with the following rule: 
After an officer has informed a suspect of his Miranda rights and has determined 
that the suspect understands those rights, the officer must then determine if the 
suspect is willing to waive those rights and answer questions. If the suspect 
responds ambiguously or equivocally, the officer must then focus on clarifying the 
suspect's intent. 
Leyva, 951 P.2d at 744. 
14 
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Asserting that he said, "Well I don't know " when Detective Bleak inquired as to 
whether he wished to give c[his] side of the story ' Defendant characterizes his response as 
ambiguous and equnocal, and aigues that Detective Bleak failed to clarify his intent to waive his 
Miranda rights Mem in Supp at 6-7 
Defendant's argument is unpersuasive First, Defendant s representation of the facts is 
inconect He did not say, "Well, I don't know " Rather, he said, "Well, it's just like, I don t 
know, I've just been hearing a lot of stuff you know7" Taken in context, the "I don't know" was 
not an expression of doubt as to whether he wished to give his side of the story, but an expression 
of doubt as to how to explain his side of the story 14 
Defendant did not explicitly state "yes" or "no" in response to Detective Bleak's question, 
but by beginning to tell his side of the story immediately after acknowledging his understanding 
of his rights, and by proceeding without objection to answer Detective Bleak's questions, he 
clearly indicated his intent to waive his Miranda rights See Leyva, 951 P 2d at 744 (concluding 
that defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights where, among other things, 
defendant responded without hesitation to officer's questions after acknowledging his right not to 
do so), State v Barrett, 147 P 3d 491, 495 (Utah Ct App 2006) (stating that "[defendant's] 
14
 In response to Detective Bleak's very next question ("What kind of stuff9"), Defendant 
continued his explanation, and again used the same expression " [Ijt's like, everything, like 
everything is talking to me, like God's talking to me and, it's like (inaudible) over the radio and 
stuff and I don't know if it's me putting the heads in my own thought or whatever and stuff, and 
just like, I don Y know, it just told me to murder " (Emphasis added) 
15 
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admission of guilt immediately after acknowledging that he understood his rights also supports 
waiver ), State v Hilfiker, 868 P 2d 826, 831 (Utah Ct App 1994) (defendant s waiver was 
knowing and intelligent where among other things,' [h]e acknowledged his rights and still 
proceeded to make the incriminating statements") See also United States v Frankson, 83 F 3d 
79, 82 (4th Cir 1996) (c [A] defendant's 'subsequent willingness to answer questions after 
acknowledging [his] Miranda rights is sufficient to constitute an implied waiver '") (quoting 
United States v Velasquez, 626 F 2d 314, 320 (3rd Cir 1980), and citing Cape v Francis, 741 
F 2d 1287, 1298 (11th Cir 1984), cert denied, 474 U S 911 (1985), United States v Stark, 609 
F 2d 271 (6th Cir 1979)) 
Defendant argues, however, that the invalidity of his waiver is shown by his subsequent 
questions about whether answering the detective's questions would help Defendant or the State 
m court, and whether he was giving a confession See Mem in Supp at 7 
In response, the State urges application of the rule that once a party has waived his 
Miranda rights, he may not invoke such rights without a clear statement See Response at 9 
(citing Davis v United States, 512 U S 452 (1994), Leyva, 951 P 2d at 742) According to the 
State, Defendant's questions are ambiguous statements that "do not rise to the level of re-
mvocation " Response at 9 
The State s argument does not address the issue raised by Defendant, which is whether 
his waiver was valid, not whether he invoked his rights after waiving them See Leyva, 951 P 2d 
16 
at 743 (uThe questions of waiver of Miranda rights and of postwaiver invocation of those rights 
are entirely separate ") (citation omitted) In essence, Defendant appears to be arguing that his 
waiver was not knowing and intelligent because he did not sufficiently undeistand its 
consequences. See State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221, 224 (Utah 1989) C'[T]he waiver [of Miranda 
rights] must have been executed with 'full awareness both of the nature of the right being 
abandoned and [of] the consequences of the decision to abandon it'") (quoting Moran v 
Burbine, 475 U S. 412, 421 (1986)) (emphasis added) 15 
On their face, Defendant's questions as to whether he was giving a confession, and as to 
whom he would be helping-himself or law enforcement officers-by answering the detective's 
questions cast doubt on whether or not he fully understood "the nature of the right being 
abandoned and . . . the consequences of the decision to abandon it " Strain, 779 P.2d at 224. 
Of course, the Court may not consider such questions in a vacuum, but must evaluate 
them together with the other "facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including the 
background, experience, and conduct of the accused " State v Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 
1985) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The difficulty here is that no evidence regarding 
Defendant's background and experience was presented at the hearing on the Motion to Suppress. 
15
 Of course, the waiver of Miranda rights must also be voluntary; that is, it "must have 
been the product of a Tree and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or 
deception.'" Strain, 779 P.2d at 224 (quoting Moran, 475 U.S. at 421). There is no issue here as 
to the voluntariness of Defendant's post-Miranda statements. 
17 
Cf. Moore, 697 P.2d at 236 (defendant's waiver was knowing and intelligent where he was "an 
intelligent and well-educated person" who had '"graduated from high school, completed two years 
of college, and r[isen] to a position of high responsibility at his place of employment"); State v. 
Dutchie, 969 P.2d 422, 429 (Utah 1998) (defendant's waiver was valid where, among other 
things, he had significant "prior experience with police and the criminal justice process").16 
Defendant's conduct here appears inconsistent. On the one hand, Defendant expressly 
affirmed that he understood the Miranda warnings, including that "anything [he] safid] c[ould] 
and w[ould] be used in court against [him]." On the other, he subsequently asked whether 
responding to questions would "help [him] in court." (Emphasis added.) If Defendant 
understood that his statements would be used "against" him in court, it is unclear why he would 
16
 At the preliminary hearing in this matter, the Court heard evidence that Defendant has 
had previous run-ins with the law, including multiple arrests by the very officer he is alleged to 
have shot. See April 3, 2007 Preliminary Hearing Transcript (filed April 19, 2007) at 14:2-6 
(testimony by Officer Jason Thomas stating that he knew Defendant prior to January 5, 2007 
because he had "arrested him a couple of times"). Had such evidence been presented at the 
suppression hearing, it may well have weighed in favor of finding that Defendant understood his 
rights. See, e^g., Dutchie, 969 P.2d at 429. However, it would be improper to incorporate, sua 
sponte, evidence from the preliminary hearing into the suppression hearing. Although "[c]ourts 
may take judicial notice of the records and prior proceedings in the same case," Riche v. Riche, 
784 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citations omitted), the facts so noticed must be "not 
subject to reasonable dispute . . . ." U.R.E. Rule 201(b). The Court cannot conclude that this 
standard is satisfied here, particularly since the Court has received no evidence as to the 
underlying reasons for the prior arrests mentioned, or whether Defendant was given Miranda 
warnings in connection with such arrests, Cf. United States v. Hall 724 F.2d 1055, 1059 (2d 
Cir. 1983) ("[T]here is force in the [trial] judge's observation that [the defendant] knew his rights 
all along since he was not a newcomer to the law, and, more important, no newcomer to the 
jurisprudence of Miranda.") (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
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have asked if such statements would "help" him m court The obvious explanation is the one 
advanced by Defendant he did not understand that his statements would be used against him 
Howe\er, this explanation is undermined by the other facts of this case Fust, Defendant 
had previously indicated that he understood his statements would be used against him in court 
Second, in response to Defendant's question as to whether answering questions would help him 
or the police m court, Detective Bleak said, in part, 
Dude, I'll be honest with you Honesty goes a long way for everyone involved 
I'll tell you that straight up Honesty goes a long way-with the prosecutor, with 
the judge-nobody wants to go into court and listen to some b s , dude, ah, ah, and 
that's the truth Honesty goes a long way-with me, with-with the judge, with the 
prosecutor 
Hence, Defendant was reminded that whatever he said would be shared with both the 
judge and the prosecutor 17 Third, throughout the interview, m response to a number of Detective 
17
 The Court acknowledges that it is troubled by the way this reminder was given, 
couched as it was m terms of the benefits of being honest See, e g , Hart v AG, 323 F 3d 884, 
894 (11th Cir 2003) ('Telling [the defendant] that 'honesty wouldn't hurt him' contradicted the 
Miranda warning that anything he said could be used against him in court ") Cf_ State v Strain, 
779 P 2d 221, 225 (Utah 1989) ("[A]ppeals to the defendant that full cooperation would be his 
best course of action have been recognized as not coercive ") (citation omitted) Had Detective 
Bleak simply given straightforward answers to Defendant's questions, it would certainly have 
made it easier for the Court to find that Defendant's waiver was knowing and intelligent See, 
e g , Rice v Cooper, 148 F 3d 747, 752 (7th Cir 1998) (where, during administration of Miranda 
warnings, defendant asked what various warnings meant, and where officer then explained the 
warnings in simpler terms, and where defendant then indicated that he understood, "[t]his pattern 
is consistent with [the defendant's] having, to the best of the police officers' knowledge, 
understood the warnings sufficiently to be able to waive them knowingly") Nevertheless, even 
assuming that Detective Bleak's responses to Defendant's questions obscured more than they 
illuminated, the Court is still persuaded, based on the remaining circumstances here, that 
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Bleak's questions Defendant simply remained silent, signifying his awareness of his right to 
speak only when he chose to do so, and of the fact that speaking might not be in his best interest 
See United States v Banks 78 F 3d 1190 1198 (7th Cir 1996) (fact that defendant 4selecti\ely 
chose not to answer some of the questions that were put to him" weighed in favor of finding that 
he understood his right to remain silent), overruled on other grounds as stated in United States v 
Shenod, 445 F 3d 980, 982 (7th Cir 2006) Fourth, at the conclusion of the interview, Detective 
Bleak told Defendant that he would be arrested, and that information was going to be given to the 
prosecutor and Defendant manifested no surprise, as would be expected if he had mistakenly 
understood that his statements were not to be used against him 
Based on the totality of the circumstances here, the Court concludes that Defendant's 
waiver was knowing and intelligent Although Defendant may not have understood, in the 
abstract, whether or not he was giving "a confession," Defendant "understood that he had the 
right to remain silent and that anything he said could be used as evidence against him " Colorado 
v Spring, 479 U S 564, 574 (1987) Consequently, the Motion to Suppress is denied as to 
Defendant's post-Miranda statements 
C. Search of Defendant's Bedroom 
The dispute with regard to the search of Defendant's bedroom is a factual one See State 
v Hansen, 63 P 3d 650, 663 (Utah 2002) ("Consent is a factual finding that should be made 
Defendant's waiver was knowing and intelligent 
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based on the totality of the circumstances."). Defendant claims that his father's consent to a 
search of the bedroom was limited to a search for Defendant's person, and did not extend to any 
other items. In contrast, the State claims that Defendant's father gave the officers consent to 
conduct a thorough search of the room for any criminal evidence. Each side bases its argument 
entirely on its own version of the facts, as respectively supported or contested by the different 
testimony offered at the suppression hearing. 
Having carefully considered the competing testimony, the Court has resolved this dispute 
in favor of the State, and therefore finds that the search conducted by the officers was not 
constitutionally offensive. "It is well established that consent provides an exception to the 
general rule prohibiting warrantless searches." State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Utah 
1987) (citations omitted).18 Accordingly, the Motion to Suppress is denied as to the evidence 
recovered from Defendant's bedroom. 
1
 Defendant has not challenged the actual or apparent authority of his father to grant 
Detective Orton's request for consent to search Defendant's bedroom. See, e.g., State v. Duran, 
131 P.3d 246, 249 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) ("A warrantless search is reasonable if it is conducted 
with the consent of the defendant or some other person who 'possesses common authority over 
or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected."') (quoting 
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974)); State v. Earl, 92 P.3d 167, 174 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2004) ("[E]ven in the absence of actual 'common authority,' if it would be reasonable for 
an officer to believe that the [third party] had 'common authority,' pursuant to Matlock, when a 
[third party] consents to the warrantless entry, the entry and search will be deemed valid.") 
(citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188-89 (1990)). Neither has Defendant asserted that 
any consent his father gave was given involuntarily. See, e.g., State v. Humphrey, 138 P.3d 590, 
594 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) ("[A] consent which is not voluntarily given is invalid.") (citation 
omitted). Because these issues have not been raised, the Court does not address them. 
21 
ORDER 
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that-
1. the Motion to Suppress is granted as to 
a. Defendant's pre-Miranda statement regarding the shotgun's location; and 
2. the Motion to Suppress is denied as to 
a. Defendant's pre-Miranda inquiry regarding Officer Thomas; 
b, Defendant's post-Miranda statements; and 
b. the evidence recovered from the search of Defendant's bedroom. 
Dated thi^jjj day of July, 2008. 
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Excerpts from Testimony of 
Christine Tallman 
A. Okay. 
Q. Do -- do you reside here in Cedar City? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And have you lived here for a while? 
A. About four years. 
Q. All right. 
And are you related to the 
^ Y \ \ V 7 \ \ w C 
M 
n 
F e a t h e r h a t ? 
A. Y e s . 
Q. And how are you related? 
A. Ah, he's my cousin. 
Q. All right. 
I want to ask you some questions about Mr. 
Featherhat and the night of January 5th, 2007; do you 
remember that night? 
A. Urn, yeah. 
Q. Okay. 
And did you have the chance to, ah, see Mr. 
Featherhat's vehicle, ah, stuck in the snow? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. 
And describe that. What were you doing at that 
time? 
A. Urn, we were coming from my house, going to my 
sister r s house. 
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And where do you live? 
I live at 634 North 380 West on North Field Road. 
In Cedar City? 
Yes . 
All right. 
And who were you with when you were going to see 
ter? 
I was with my boyfriend and my three kids. 
What's your boyfriend's name? 
Pedro Hinojosa. 
And how -- do you have three children? 
Yes . 
What are their names. 
Dareek Zahne, Dashan Zahne, Macayla Tallman. 
And how old were they when this happened? Do you 
? 
Ah, I think four, six, and seven. 
Okay. So they were just young children. 
Yes . 
And whose vehicle were you in? 
Pedro's. 
What kind of vehicle is it? Do you remember? 
No, I don't. 
All right. 
I think it was a Honda Passport. 
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An SUV type vehicle? 
Yeah. 
Q. All right. 
Who was driving? 
Ah, Pedro was. 
Where were you seated? 
A passenger. 
And where were your children? 
In the back seat. 
And where were you headed? 
To my s :i s ter ' s ho us e . 
And where does she live? 
Ah, I don't know the address. I e 
by Kolob, those houses. 
Q. All right. 
P ' IM •; mi \ ii 111 A/a ' t o y o u r s i s t e r ' s 
house.. ""id >;L -=•'- jnything unusual? 
Urn, i iu . J u s t - - i i ''.Mji-i in i hi- n i i f w . 
And where was that at? 
Right around the corner. I don't know what the 
, but 
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Q. If I showed you this map here (Indicated) maybe 
you could step down and identify where you were at. Do you 
recognize -- first of all, let me ask you if you recognize 
it, if you can orient yourself to the map. 
A. Can I go down and look at it? 
Q. Yeah. (Witness complied.) 
I believe this is Kolob here (Indicated). 
A. Right around here (Indicated). 
Q. Okay. 
So the witness has ide n t: :i f j e c:l t: h e intersection of 
600 West and .1 3 2 5 N o r t h on the map, Your Hono r A n d t: h I s 
is right here (Indicated) is where you saw the truck 
si 1 . ^ sirlp oi the road? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Thank you. Yo1; .ck. 
All right. And wha: J; i yoi; • > when you saw the 
vehicle stopped by the siae •* *> 
A. Urn, we stopped and he askec. - Bryan asked us if 
we could pull him the side of the road cause his truck was, 
I th i ii 1! ;: c i 1 1 Df gas and so 
Q. Where was his truck? Was it in the middle of the 
road? 
A. Ah, kind of like on this side of the road 
(Indicated). 
Q. Okay. 
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A. And so we pulled over in front of his truck and 
we didn't have a chain. So he started looking for a chain 
in back of his truck. 
Q. Did he find one? 
A. Ah, yeah. 
Q. And what happened next? 
A. Urn, he started hookin' up the chain to the truck 
And we pulled him a little bit forward, just a little, and 
that's when Officer Thomas pulled up behind him. 








Urn, yeah, cause he turned his lights on. 
You knew it was an officer? 
Yes. 
I nutted i a t e l y ? 
Um-hn i Because the l ights came on so. 
Okay. 
Was it dark outside? 
A. Urn, yeah. 
Q. Do vo'ii (Ju you t e mo ruber, ah, about what time it 
was ? 
A. No I don!t. 
Q. But it was dark? 
A Yes . 
Q. And describe the conditions outside, the weather 
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A. It was cold, snowy. 
Q. All right. 
And so you -- you were able to pull his vehicle 
forward a little bit. What happened next? 
A. Urn, that's as far as we coul >ecause 
Officer pulled up and he got out and he was talkin' to 
Bryan in the back. And --
Q. Did you ijcl nut of your vehicle? 
A. Urn, yeah I did. I got out. And I stood there 
for a while and the officer i.'uiin- up I <> n - ;e asked urn, 
or Bryan came up to me and asked me if I could - - • -.^ 
that I was drivin' him, and I told him 1: i 
Q. Bryan wanted you say you were driving - -
A. Yeah. By the time the officer was behind, him so 
he heard him, t - :.: > * . 
Q Did he want you to say you were driving his 




se to you? 
aiTh.' lip to 
A That was it. 
And he turned around . -
me and asked me for ray ID, and I told him that my ID was 
home. And he just told me to hang on riqiii t (IOFP . tint he 
went Lu Liu- back and he started talking to Bryan. 
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Q. Okay. 
And were you still outside of your vehicle? 
A. No. I got back in. 
Q. Did you get into the passenger side or the 
A. I got in the passenger's side. 
Q. And where were your kids? 
A. They were in the back. 
Q. Of the vehicle? 
A. In the -- yeah. 
Q. Did they stay there the whole time? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. All right. And whe T ^* w.\;: Pedro? 
A Um, he was on the passenger's side. 
Q In the vehicle? 
A. Yeah. 
Q Okay. 
A n d w 1 M I h a p p e n e d n e x t ? 
A,. Urn, t h» " were in the ba<-.- . talking, and all of a 
'udden ve heard gunshots. And i : t 
t of t-h^  t-r-i-iny ^rcj ^ _ •;- "an with my 
kids . 
Q. Okay. Now, when you say you. heard gunshots, 
where were you at when you heard gunshots? 
A. Oh, I was -- v ' • . s, I was in 
the truck. And when I heard :! J stepped > .' if t. he 
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1 || truck. 
2 || Q. And can you identify her on this map, do you --
3 || do you recognize that? Can you kind of orient yourself to 
4 || what this is (Indicated)? 
A, Yeah. 
6 || Q. Okay. 
7 || So this -- is this a map of the scene? 
8 || A. Um-hm. 
9 || Q. And, ah, if this -- if this were Officer Thomas's 
10 || vehicle (Indicated) and this were Bryan Featherhat f s 
11 || vehicle, where was, ah, Pedro's vehicle? 
12 || .A. Ah, right e ( 1 r i d i c , i ! <•• d ) . 
i ** II Q. Was right here (Indicated)? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Facing this way to the west? 
A. Yes. 
THE CO 1JRT : I s :i t c 1 e ar f r oin t he doci iinen t wha t 
s h e ' s d e s c r i b i n g h e r e ? 
Q. (BY MR. GARRETT): I d o n ' t k n o w . Let nit* w m i wi l l ) 
h e r :> n t h a t: . 
2 1 II If this direction is down is, on this map is 
22 II west, wouJii it in- I ,J i i I n ,,, i I hat ynui vehicle was parked 
directly west of the defendant's vehicle? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
Q. And was it facing west, (Indicated) your vehie] e? 
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JOSEPH M. LIDDELL, CSR, RPR PAGE 7 4 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And was there a chain that ~ - that was 
hooking your vehicle or Pedro's vehicle to the defendant's 
vehicle (Indicated)? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And is that the chain that you had used to tow 
the defendant's vehicle to this position? 
A. Yeah. 
Q . Mow could you identify on this map -vhe: : B the 
defendant's vehicle was when you first saw it? 
A. Um, kind of like where the patrol truck's parked 
(Indicated). 
Q. Okay. So almost in the same position as Officer 
Thomas " \ ;r e h i c L e . 
A. Yeah. 
Q . So you p U H e d i t maybe a car 1 eng th a nci a ha 1 f ; 
i 3 that accurate? 
A. Ah, not that far. It j i ist kind of went up a 
J :i 111 e because the t:i i: e started sp:i nning 
Q. Okay. 
A. -- on Pedro's right. 
Q So you were getting stuck, yourself. 
A Um-hm. 
Q All right. 
a
 Even though he had i t in f our -by- f our , tlie t i re 
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was just spinning. 
Q. All right. 
And so you were seated in this vehicle, Pedro's 
vehicle right here (Indicated) when you heard gunshots. 
A. Yeah. 
Q. How did you know they were gunshots? 
A. Urn, you could tell they were gunshots. 
Q. How many did you hear? 
A. I can't recall . 
Q. Where was Pedro when you -- when you heard the 
A. Ah, he was on the pass- Iriver's sii- Once 
. >t , h e g o t iiiy -: • --r ? 
Q. Where did they run to? Can you an
 tou show 
x^A *cliio iiiap tut. direction that they went? 
A. Urn, this way (Indica: v..-,.:) . 
Q. Okay. She's pointing r the left side of the 
map . 
A Towards those apartments that are right in the 
corner. 
O All right. 
So they so he ran he ran, ah, would it be 
n< :) i: t:h < : >n across 13 2 5 Nc: > i: th this way (Ind i cated) ? 
1! Ah, yeah.. 
0 Y e a h . 11: w o u ] d fa e n o r t h Okay. 
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1 So he crossed 1325, going north, into some 
2 apartments over here on the (Indicated) -- which would be 
3 on the north side of this map. 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. And he had your children with him? 
6 A. Yeah. 
7 Q. Okay. 
8 And what did you do? 
9 A. I -- I went into shock. I was just standing 
10 there until I seen Bryan come around with the gun. And I 
11 turned around and I started running and he was telling me, 
12 "Let's go. Let's drive. Drive me," and I just turned 
13 around and I kept running. And when I glanced back, he 
14 was, urn, unlashing the chain and he took off in the truck. 
15 Q. Which truck? 
16 A. Pedro's truck? 
17 Q. He took Pedro's truck. 
18 A. Um-hm. 
19 Q. All right. I want to just slow you down a little 
20 bait and kind of walk you through this. When you first 
2 1 II heard the gunshots, were you looking in the direction of 
22 the gunfire? 
23 A. Urn, when I got out, yeah. But I couldn't see 
24 I anything because Pedro's truck was right there. 
2 5
 Q. So you couldn't see who had fired a gun. 
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Q. Did you stand there for a little while? 
A. Yeah. I did. 
Q. How long would you say, after you heard the 
gunshots, you stood there? 
A. Ah, maybe 15 seconds. 
Q. And were you just standing in the road right here 
(Indicated) next to your -- next to Pedro's vehicle? 
A. Yeah. I had the doors open and I was standing 
like right there. 
Q. All right. 
And you stood there for 15 seconds and then you 
A. Almost 15? 
Q. -- indicated that you saw Bryan coming towards 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Where did he come from? 
A. From between the rides. 
Q. From these two vehicles --
A. Yeah. 
Q. -- positioned on the map (Indicated)? 
A. His truck and Pedro's truck. 
Q. Was he coming on the street side or was he coming 
you? 
on the snow bank side of the vehicle? 
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A. Ah, like the snow bank, like right --
Q. Right along here (Indicated)? 
A. He didn't come over here (Indicated), like in 
between here's his --
Q. In between these vehicles --
A. -- and here's Pedro's truck. 
Q. -- and then out onto the road. 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Okay. 
So he came north between the two vehicles onto --
right onto 1325 North, and came down towards you right in 
the middle of the road (Indicated); --
A. Um-hm. 
Q. -- is that correct? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And when you saw him, describe what you saw. 
A. Ah, I just saw him running with the gun. And I 
told him --
Q. Can you describe the gun? 
A. No. I just -- it was long I think. 
Q. Okay. 
And you recognized it as a gun? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. What features about it made you think that it was 
a gun? 
CERTIFIED OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT 
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A. Urn, cause I seen it. 
Q. A barrel? A --
A. I can't really describe how it looked. It was 
just like long. And he started yelling to me, saying, 
"Let's go. Drive me." And that's when I turned around and 
I ran towards the kids. 
Q. How close were you to the defendant, at this time 
when he was approaching you with the gun? 
A. Urn, kind of like right around the vehicle, like 
just approaching the vehicle in the back. 
Q. From me to you (IndicatedO? 
A. Ah, yeah. 
Q. This close? Maybe 5 feet? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. All right. And then you turned and ran. Which 
way did you run? 
A. I ran towards where Pedro had ran with my kids. 
Q. Do you catch up to hem? 
A. Urn, yes. 
Q. And where did you go to? 
A. We stayed there for a while and I told Pedro, I 
said, "We need a phone. We need a phone," and he gave me 
his cell phone and I dialed 911. 
Q. When you were -- when you were -- when you caught 
up with Pedro over here (Indicated), could you still see 
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Pedro's vehicle out in the road? 
A. Urn, by that time it took off. 
Q. Did you see it take off? 
A. Um-hm. 
Q. And what -- describe exactly what you saw. 
A. Urn, I saw Bryan. Well, when I was running from 
the vehicle, when Bryan came around with the gun, I started 
rung. And when I looked back, he was, urn, undoing the 
chain? 
Q. So the chain was still hooked up between Pedro's 
vehicle and the defendant's vehicle (Indicated). 
A. Yes. 
Q. So Mr. Featherhat, the defendant, had to unhook 
the chain. 
A. Um-hm. 
Q. And then what next? 
A. Then he took off in it. 
Q. Took off in Pedro's vehicle? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Do you know which direction he was going? 
A. Ah, no. I just seen him go straight to where --
Q. Straight down on this map? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So he was headed west? 
A. Um-hm. 
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1 Q. All right. 
2 Did you see him again after that? 
3 A. No, I didn't. 
4 Q. And then what you did you do, over here with 
5 Pedro and your kids? 
6 A. Urn, there was these people that were outside 
7 their house. They told us how we could go take my kids 
8 into their house, and so we went in there. 
9 Q. And you stayed there? 
10 A. Yeah. 
1 1 II Q. Did you call the police? 
12 A. Yes, I did. 
13 Q. Ho that come you called the police? What were 
14 you trying to report? 
15 A. Ah, saying that there was a shooting and that 
16 Bryan took off on the truck. 
17 Q. Did, ah -- did you give Bryan permission to take 
18 Pedro's vehicle? 
19 A. No, I didn't. 
20 Q. Did you hear if Pedro gave Bryan permission? 
21 A. No. 
22 Q. No, you didn't hear? Or no, he did not? 
23 A. No, he did not. 
24 I Q. So Bryan took the -- Pedro's vehicle without 
25 permission. 
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A. Yeah. 
Q. All right. 
And did you -- are you the one that spoke with 
the police? 
A. Urn, I spoke with a 911 dispatcher. 
Q. Did you report the vehicle stolen? 
A. I just said that he went and took off on it. 
Q. Okay. 
How come you, ah, ran away from Bryan? 
A. I got scared. 
Q. And how come you were scared? 
A. I don't know. Just what happened, and he had a 
gun . 
Q. Do you know, ah, if that night, were you -- were 
you ever in close proximity to Bryan? I mean within a 
couple of feet of him that night during that stop? 
A. Like talking to him? 
Q. Um-hm. 
A. Urn, I can't recall. 
Q. Do you know if he'd been consuming alcohol? 
A. Ah, when he came up to me, saying that for me to 
tell the officer that I was driving, yes, I could smell 
alcohol on him. 
Q. All right. 
A strong odor of alcohol? 
CERTIFIED OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT 
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A. Um-hm. 
Q. Did you see him drinking any alcohol? 
A. Urn, no. 
Q. And do you recognize the defendant here today? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you identify him for the record? 
A. Bryan Featherhat. 
Q. And where is he located? In the courtroom? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Where? 
A. There (Indicated). 
Q. You're pointing to the man, the gentlemen dressed 
in the blue suit here --
A. Yes. 
Q. -- at counsel table? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. 
And he's your cousin? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And he's the one that you saw coming at you with 
a gun that night. 
A. Yes. 
MR, GARRETT: Okay. I have nothing further at 
this time, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
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1 Mr. Burns, you may cross examine. 
2 MR. BURNS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
3 CROSS EXAMINATION 
4 BY MR. BURNS: 
5 Q. Bryan is your cousin; is that correct? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Have you had -- do you know him very well from 
8 before, ah, this night? 
9 A. Ah, no. 
10 Q. Did you spend much time with him at family 
11 functions or events? 
12 A. Ah, I used to drink with him once in a while. 
13 Q. When -- when you were first stopped to help and 
14 you recognized him, ah, on the side of the road and that's 
15 why you stopped to help; is that correct? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. And, ah, were -- were you at all afraid, ah, -
18 during the process of helping him move his vehicle from the 
19 road? Afraid of Bryan? 
2 0 A. No. 
21 Q. Did you, ah -- and then, ah, you testified that 
22 during this - - during this course, urn, that you witnessed 
23 Bryan shooting at Officer Thomas; is that correct? 
2 4
 A. I didn't say that I witnessed. I said that I 
25 heard the gunshots. 
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1 Q. You heard them? Okay. 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. And -- and then, ah, after hearing the shots, 
4 did -- did Bryan talk to you? Did he say anything to you? 
5 A. N Q . He just ran towards me, telling him, "Let's 
6 go. Drive me." And that's when I turned around and I ran 
7 towards my kids. 
8 Q. So he was -- he was talking to you. He said, 
9 "Let's go. Ah, drive me." Did he say, "Will you drive 
10 me?" Did he just say, "Drive me." Do you remember exactly 
11 what he said? 
12 A. Urn, he said, "Let's go." Can I swear? 
13 THE COURT: Just answer the question. 
14 THE WITNESS: He said, "Let's go. Fucking drive 
15 me. Let ' s go." 
16 Q. (BY MR. B U R N S ) : Okay. 
17 Ah, and then did he ask you to get in the vehicle 
1 8 II with him to drive? Do you remember that? 
19 A. Urn, no. 
2 0 I! Q. You don't remember that? 
21 A. No. 
22 Q. Do you remember, ah, did you -- did you get in 
23 I the vehicle to drive him? 
2 4 A. No. 
2 5 II Q. Okay. 
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1 Did -- did he ever point the gun at you? 
2 A. No. 
3 Q. Were you afraid that: he was gonna shoot at you? 
4 A. Urn, no. I just got scared because he had the gun 
5 and what went on. 
6 Q. Okay. 
7 Did you feel like he was -- did you feel 
8 threatened, ah, as to your personal safety at that time 
9 when he was asking to take the car? (No verbal response.) 
10 When you -- when you turned and -- why didn't you get in 
11 the car and drive him? 
12 A. Because I didn't want to. 
13 Q. Okay. 
14 And when you turned and ran the other direction 
15 away from him, were you afraid that he was gonna shoot at 
16 you or did you just not want to be involved in what just a 
17 happened? 
18 A. Urn, I kind of thought like that, but at the same 
19 time I -- I was just scared. 
2 0 Q. Okay. 
21 Were you afraid, urn, that you were never gonna 
22 see your car again? Did you think that he'd -- was it his 
23 intent to steel your car? Do you know, on talking to him? 
24 II A. He took off on it. I didn't give him permission. 
2 5 Q. Okay. 
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Excerpts from Testimony of 
Pedro Hinojosa 
INTERPRETER: Yes, because I had already pulled 
it once. 
Q. And did it remain connected during the entire 
stop while the officer was there? 
INTERPRETER: Yes. 
Q. I want you to identify it then where you were 
standing when you first heard a gunshot. 
INTERPRETER: I was here on this side right here 
(Indicated). 
Q. And he's pointing in to the middle of the road 
right next to where his vehicle would be on 1325 North 
(Indicated). And is this location in Cedar City? 
INTERPRETER: Yes. 
Q. All right. 
And so could you tell where the gunshots were 
coming from when you heard them? 
INTERPRETER: From behind here (Indicated) from 
where the officers' patrol truck was. 
Q. But you couldn't see any - - you couldn't see the 
individuals involved? 
INTERPRETER: I didn't see anything. Just when I 
heard the shots, I ran. 
Q. What was blocking your view here (Indicated)? 
INTERPRETER: Bryan's pickup. That was right 
there. (Indicated). 
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1 Q. So after you heard the shots fired, did you run 
2 immediately? 
3 J! INTERPRETER: I ran because I saw that he was 
4 running on the other side, too (Indicated). 
5 Q. Show us where Bryan came from. 
6 INTERPRETER: From this side like this 
7 (Indicated) he came out. 
8 Q. Okay. 
9 So he -- he came between the front of his truck 
10 and the back of your truck. 
11 INTERPRETER: Yes. 
12 Q. Describe what you saw when -- when Bryan 
13 appeared. 
14 INTERPRETER: Okay. 
15 When he appeared, he appeared screaming 
16 something, and I could not understand because I don't 
17 understand English. He knelt down and he threw the weapon 
18 he had. He put it on the ground. 
19 If Q. Can you describe the weapon? 
20 INTERPRETER: It's a short weapon, short like* 
21 this (Indicated). It's black. I saw with the light from 
22 the vehicles. 
23 Q. You were going like this (Indicated) describing 
24 the weapon. What are you describing there with that 
25 motion? 
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THE COURT: Mr. Garrett, maybe you should 
describe that motion. 
Q. (BY MR. GARRETT): Well, it's kind of a downward 
motion like a curve maybe in the weapon. 
INTERPRETER: It was not a normal long straight 
weapon like the other ones. It was curved like this 
(Indicated). 
Q. Do you know what kind of gun it was? 
INTERPRETER: Not exactly. I have seen weapons 
like that, but I don't know exactly what type it is. 
Q. Would it be fair to describe it as a pistol grip? 
INTERPRETER: Yes. 
Q. Okay. 
And, ah, he knelt down and put the gun on the 
ground. What happened next? 
INTERPRETER: He unhooked the chain, he took his 
weapon and he got in my vehicle and he drove off. 
Q. Where were you when he put the gun down and 
unhooked the vehicle? 
INTERPRETER: With the children on the side of 
the vehicle, starting to run. 
Q. Did you get the children out of the vehicle? 
INTERPRETER: Yes. 
Q. How come? 
INTERPRETER: Because of fear. The children were 
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very frightened. I was afraid that he would do something 
to him, to the children. I don't know what could have 
happened. 
Q. So did you physically take the children out of 
the vehicle? 
INTERPRETER: Yes. I took 'em out. 
Q. And did you grab their hands and run? 
INTERPRETER: Yes. 
Q. And where did you run to? 
INTERPRETER: Towards the apartments. 
Q. And did you see if -- what happened to your 
vehicle? 
INTERPRETER: He took it. He stole it from me. 
He took it. 
Q. Did you give him permission to take your vehicle? 
INTERPRETER: No. 
Q. Did you want him to take your vehicle? 
INTERPRETER: No. 
Q. Was it okay that he took your vehicle? 
INTERPRETER: No. 
Q. And so what did you do next, after you ran over 
with the children over here (Indicated)? 
INTERPRETER: When we left, what we did is I 
tried -- I tried to tell my girlfriend, but she didn't 
understand me. But I tried to tell her to call, but she 
CERTIFIED OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT 
JOSEPH M. LIDDELL, CSR, RPR PAGE 10 3 
called anyway. 
0. Called who? 
INTERPRETER: Ah, the police. 
Q. Okay. 
INTERPRETER: Called the police. 
Q. Okay. You can sit down. Thank you. 
When was the next time you saw your vehicle? 
INTERPRETER: I saw it again, a week later, I saw 
my vehicle. 
Q. So you didn't get it back for a week. 
INTERPRETER: Yes. 
Q. Was that your only vehicle? 
INTERPRETER: Yes. 
Q. How did you get around during that -- that week 
you didn't have your vehicle? 
INTERPRETER: I get rides. 
Q. All right. 
I want to show you what's been marked as State's 
Exhibit No. 41 and No. 42. Do you recognize this 
photograph No. 41? 
INTERPRETER: Yes. 
Q. What is it? 
INTERPRETER: It's my vehicle. 
Q. Okay. 
And -- and photograph No. 42? 
CERTIFIED OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT 
JOSEPH M. LIDDELL, CSR, RPR PAGE 104 
INTERPRETER: It is my vehicle. 
Q. How do you know that? 
INTERPRETER: I know it. I know this part. I 
know my whole vehicle (Indicated). 
Q. Okay. 
Now, did you -- did you, ah -- you already 
indicated you did not know Mr. Featherhat (Indicated), 
INTERPRETER: No. 
Q. Did you have any, ah, shotgun shells in your 
vehicle the night this happened? 
INTERPRETER: No. 
Q. Do you own a shotgun? 
INTERPRETER: No. 
Q. Can you identify the defendant here in the 
courtroom today? 
INTERPRETER: It's him? 
Q. Seated left of counsel here in the blue suit? 
INTERPRETER: Yes. 
MR. GARRETT: All right. That's all I have, Your 
Honor. 
Q. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Burns, you may cross examine. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR, BURNS: 
Thank you. 1 
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1 From the times that you -- from the time that you 
2 first heard the shots, what did you then start to do? 
3 INTERPRETER: When I heard the shots, I turned 
4 back to look where they were coming from and then I ran to 
5 get the children. 
6 Q. Where were you standing when you first heard the 
7 shots in relation to your vehicle and Bryan Featherhat's 
8 vehicle? 
9 INTERPRETER: I was on the side of my vehicle. 
10 Q. And so you say you ran to get the kids, does that 
11 mean you took a step towards your vehicle? 
12 INTERPRETER: Yes. I walked towards my vehicle. 
13 Q. How long did it take you to remove the kids from 
14 the vehicle? Do you know? 
15 INTERPRETER: Okay. 
16 I don't know exactly, because I didn't measure 
17 the time. But I moved as fast as I could because there was 
18 II three of them and they were heavy and there was snow. But 
19 I don't know exactly how much time it took. 
2 0 Q. Okay. 
21 You testified that Bryan Featherhat -- that Bryan 
22 approached you and was talking to you excitedly; is that 
23 correct? 
24 INTERPRETER: No. I never said he was excited 
25 when he came towards me, or do you mean when he asked help 
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or when he ran? 
Q. When -- after you heard the shots, you were then 
in the process of taking the children out of the vehicle; 
is that correct? 
INTERPRETER: Yes. 
Q. And some time near to that time, Bryan approached 
the vehicle. 
INTERPRETER: It was when he ran with the weapon. 
Q. Okay. 
And he was saying something to you; is that 
correct? 
INTERPRETER: He would say something. I don't 
know exactly what he would say because I don't understand, 
but he would say something. 
Q. Okay. 
Was he pointing the gun at you when he was saying 
it? 
INTERPRETER: No. 
Q. What -- when he said something to you, what was 
your response? Did you respond to him? 
INTERPRETER: No. Nothing. I kept running. I 
didn't do anything. 
Q. Okay. 
You testified that you watched him set the gun 
down. 
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INTERPRETER: Yes. I saw him put the gun down on 
the ground when he, ah, unhooked the chain. 
Q. Was that before or after he had said something to 
you? 
INTERPRETER: First he says something. First he 
came screaming, saying something, and then he put it on the 
ground. 
Q. Where were the kids when he put the shotgun on 
the ground? 
INTERPRETER: The children, I was taking them 
towards the apartment. I was taking them. 
Q. So you already had them out of the vehicle at 
that time? 
INTERPRETER: Yes. When he was screaming, I 
already had the children. 
Q. Were you afraid? 
INTERPRETER: Lots. 
Q. And why were you afraid? 
INTERPRETER: I thought I have already been in 
shots like that. In Mexico once I was in an exchange of 
shots and I was afraid that I would get hit. 
Q. Were -- were you afraid because he pointed the 
gun at you? 
INTERPRETER: No. He didn't point at me. 
Q. After he got done talking to you, were you afraid 
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that he was going to shoot at you? 
INTERPRETER: Yes. 
Q. After he set the gun down, were you afraid that 
he was going to shoot at you? 
INTERPRETER: I was afraid. I was running. I 
was afraid that he would want me to help him out or 
something. 
Q. So you were afraid that he was going -- you were 
afraid to become any more involved in what had just 
happened; is that correct? 
INTERPRETER: Yes. Well, yes, because I had 
nothing to do with what had happened. 
Q. Do you know, ah, you testified it took about a 
week for you to get your vehicle back. 
INTERPRETER: Yes. 
Q. Do you know where the vehicle was during that 
week? 
INTERPRETER: The police had it. 
Q. Do you -- do you -- were you informed as to when 
they first got it back? 
INTERPRETER: They recovered it in the morning 
like at 3:00 or 4:00 a.m. they told me they had recovered 
it . 
Q. Was there anything missing out of your vehicle 
when you got it back? 
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Exhibit D 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 0 
Before you may find Defendant BRYAN FEATHERHAT guilty of the offense of Attempted 
Aggravated Murder as charged in Count 1 of the Amended Information, the State must prove and 
you must find, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every one of the following 
elements: 
1. That the Defendant intentionally or knowingly attempted to cause the death of Jason 
Thomas; and 
2. That the attempted homicide was committed: 
A. Incident to an act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode during 
which the actor committed or attempted to commit aggravated robbery; or 
B. For the purpose of avoiding or preventing an arrest of the Defendant or 
another by a peace officer acting under color of legal authority; or 
C. Against a peace officer, or law enforcement officer, and the officer was either 
on duty or the attempted homicide was based on, or was related to, that official position, and the 
actor knew, or reasonably should have known, that the officer held that official position; 
3. The absence of an affirmative defense which the Defendant has put into issue; and 
4. That such acts occurred on or about January 5, 2007, in Iron County, State of Utah. 
If the State of Utah has failed to prove any one or more of the previously described elements, 
you must find the Defendant not guilty of the offense of Attempted Aggravated Murder as charged 
in Count 1 of the Amended Information. If the State has proved, however, each and every one of 
the foregoing elements to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt, then it is your duty to find 
the Defendant guilty of Attempted Aggravated Murder as charged in Count 1 of the Amended 
Information. 
000408 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
If your unanimous verdict is that the Defendant is not guilty of Attempted Aggravated 
Murder as charged in Count 1 of the Amended Information, you must acquit him of that charge. In 
that event you must next consider the lesser included offense of Aggravated Assault. The State must 
prove and you must find, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the 
following elements before you can find Defendant BRYAN FEATHERHAT guilty of Aggravated 
Assault: 
1. That the Defendant acted knowingly or intentionally; 
2. That the Defendant did commit an act, with unlawful force or violence, that caused 
serious bodily injury to another; 
3. The absence of an affirmative defense which the Defendant put into issue; and 
4. That such acts occurred on or about January 5, 2007, in Iron County, State of Utah. 
If the State of Utah has failed to prove any one or more of the previously described elements, 
you must find the Defendant not guilty of the offense of Aggravated Assault, a lesser included 
offense. If the State has proved, however, each and every one of the foregoing elements to your 
satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt, then it is your duty to find the Defendant guilty of 
Aggravated Assault, a lesser included offense. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 1 2 
Before you may find Defendant BRYAN FE ATHERHAT guilty of the offense of Aggravated 
Robbery as charged in Count 2 of the Amended Information, the State must prove and you must find, 
unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every one of the following elements: 
1. That the Defendant unlawfully and intentionally took or attempted to take personal 
property in the possession of another from his or her person, or immediate presence, against his or 
her will, by means offeree or fear, and with a purpose or intent to deprive the person permanently 
or temporarily of the personal property; 
2. That, in the course of committing the robbery, the Defendant: (a) used or threatened 
to use a dangerous weapon; or (b) took or attempted to take an operable motor vehicle; 
3. The absence of an affirmative defense which the Defendant has put into issue; and 
4. That such acts occurred on or about January 5, 2007, in Iron County, State of Utah. 
If the State of Utah has failed to prove any one or more of the previously described elements, 
you must find the Defendant not guilty of the offense of Aggravated Robbery as charged in Count 2 
of the Amended Information. If the State has proved, however, each and every one of the foregoing 
elements to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt, then it is your duty to find the 
Defendant guilty of Aggravated Robbery as charged in Count 2 of the Amended Information. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. \l 
If your unanimous verdict is that the Defendant is not guilty of Aggravated Robbery as 
charged in Count 2 of the Amended Information, you must acquit him of that charge. In that event 
you must next consider the lesser included offense of Theft. The State must prove and you must 
find, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every one of the following elements 
before you can find Defendant BRYAN FEATHERHAT guilty of Theft: 
1. That the Defendant obtained or exercised^control over the property of another; 
2. That the Defendant had a purpose to deprive the owner thereof; 
3. That said property was a motor vehicle; 
4. The absence of an affirmative defense which the Defendant put into issue; and 
5. That such acts occurred on or about January 5, 2007, in Iron County, State of Utah. 
If the State of Utah has failed to prove any one or more of the previously described elements, 
you must find the Defendant not guilty of the offense of Theft, a lesser included offense. If the State 
has proved, however, each and every one of the foregoing elements to your satisfaction and beyond 
a reasonable doubt, then it is your duty to find the Defendant guilty of Theft, a lesser included 
offense. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 14 
If your unanimous verdict is that the Defendant is not guilty of Theft, you must acquit him 
of that charge In that event, you must next consider the lesser included offense ot Unauthorized 
lb? 
Control of a Motor Vehicle for an Extended Time Jbm State must prove and you must find, 
unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every one of the following elements before 
you can find Defendant BRYAN FEATHERHAT guilty of Unauthorized Control of a Motor Vehicle 
for an Extended Time 
1 That the Defendant obtained or exercised unauthorized control over a motor vehicle 
of another without the owner's or lawful custodian's consent, 
2 That the Defendant acted with the intent to temporarily deprive the owner or lawful 
custodian of possession of the motor vehicle, 
3 That the Defendant did not return the motor vehicle to the owner or lawful custodian 
within 24 hours after the exercise of unlawful control, 
4. The absence of an affirmative defense which the Defendant put into issue, and 
5. That such acts occurred on or about January 5, 2007, in Iron County, State of Utah 
If the State of Utah has failed to prove any one or more of the previously described elements, 
you must find the Defendant not guilty of the offense of Unauthorized Control of a Motor Vehicle 
for an Extended Time, a lesser included offense If the State has proved, however, each and every 
one of the foregoing elements to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt, then it is your duty 
to find the Defendant guilty of Unauthorized Control of a Motor Vehicle for an Extended Time, a 
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Criminal No. 071500011 
Judge G. Michael Westfall 
We, the jury duly impaneled in the above-entitled action, find as follows: 
Count 1: ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED MURDER 
A. That the Defendant, BRYAN FEATHERHAT, is guilty of Attempted Aggravated 
Murder as charged in Count 1 of the Amended Information. 
YES 
OR 
B. That the Defendant, BRYAN FEATHERHAT, is guilty of the lesser included 
offense of Aggravated Assault. 
YES 
OR 
That the Defendant, BRYAN FEATHERHAT, is not guilty of Attempted 
Aggravated Murder as charged in Count 1 of the Amended Information, as the 
offense is unproven by the burden of evidence required, and not guilty of the lesser 
included offense of Aggravated Assault. 
YES 
n n n / o / 
OR 
That the Defendant, BRYAN FEATHERHAT, is not guilty, by reason of insanity. 
of Attempted Aggravated Murder as charged in Count 1 of the Amended 
Information, as the offense is unproven by the burden of evidence required, and not 
guilty, by reason of insanity, of the lesser included offense of Aggravated Assault. 
YES 
Count 2: AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
That the Defendant, BRYAN FEATHERHAT, is guilty of Aggravated Robbery as 
charged in Count 2 of the Amended Information. 
YES 
OR 
That the Defendant, BRYAN FEATHERHAT, is guilty of the lesser included 
offense of Theft. 
YES 
OR 
That the Defendant, BRYAN FEATHERHAT, is guilty of the lesser included 
offense of Unauthorized Control of a Motor Vehicle for an Extended Time. 
YES 
OR 
That the Defendant, BRYAN FEATHERHAT, is not guilty of Aggravated Robbery 
as charged in Count 2 of the Amended Information, as the offense is unproven by the 
burden of evidence required, and not guilty of the lesser included offenses of Theft 
and Unauthorized Control of a Motor Vehicle for an Extended Time. 
YES 
OR 
That the Defendant, BRYAN FEATHERHAT, is not guilty, bv reason of insanity. 
of Aggravated Robbery as charged in Count 2 of the Amended Information, as the 
offense is unproven by the burden of evidence required, and not guilty, by reason 
of insanity, of the lesser included offenses of Theft and Unauthorized Control of a 
Motor Vehicle for an Extended Time. 
YES 
The jury foreperson should mark only one "yes," for each count, on this jury verdict. 
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SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
Case No. 071500011 
Judge G. Michael Westfall 
Check one of the following verdicts for each count: 
Count 1: ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED MURDER 
We, the jury in the above case, having unanimously found beyond a reasonable 
doubt all the elements of the crime of Attempted Aggravated Murder, or the lesser 
included crime of Aggravated Assault, also unanimously find by a preponderance 
/ of the evidence that the Defendant was mentally ill at the time of the crime. 
We, the jury in the above case, having unanimously found beyond a reasonable 
doubt all the elements of the crime of Attempted Aggravated Murder, or the lesser 
included crime of Aggravated Assault, also unanimously find by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the defendant was not mentally ill at the time of the crime. 
Count 2: AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
We, the jury in the above case, having unanimously found beyond a reasonable 
doubt all the elements of the crime of Aggravated Robbery, or the lesser included 
crimes of Theft or Unauthorized Control of a Motor Vehicle for an Extended 
Time, also unanimously find by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
Defendant was mentally ill at the time of the crime. 
We, the jury in the above case, having unanimously found beyond a reasonable 
doubt all the elements of the crime of Aggravated Robbery, or the lesser included 
crimes of Theft or Unauthorized Control of a Motor Vehicle for an Extended 
000427 
Time, also unanimously find by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
Defendant was not mentally ill at the time of the crime. 
^ f / / i 
DATED t h i s ^ . — ^ day of November, 200& k _ ./? i -
{ 
FOREPERSON 
\ \ 
CONCURRING JURORS: 
